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The Los Alamos Fire Department (LAFD) provides emergency response services 
to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The laboratory places high expectations on the 
delivery of these services; over a twenty-year period, however, multiple third-party 
evaluators identified problems with the LAFD’s pre-incident planning process. This 
thesis investigated pre-incident planning improvement methods and found that the LAFD 
plans for the Los Alamos National Laboratory lacked information and collaborative 
efforts. A review of related literature and best practices from other national laboratory 
sites and accredited fire departments provided potential solutions. This research 
recommends that the LAFD establish a working group to improve the pre-incident 
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The Department of Energy (DOE) operates seventeen national laboratories across 
the United States. These laboratories conduct scientific research across a wide spectrum 
of topics, including the environment, health, computing, and national security. Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) focuses on national security. LANL was 
established in 1943, and its staff work to “provide the best scientific and engineering 
solutions to the nation’s most crucial security challenges.”1 LANL is infamously known 
as Site Y for the Manhattan Project: the newly established laboratory was asked to design 
and build the world’s first atomic bomb.  
The Los Alamos Fire Department (LAFD) provides emergency response services 
to LANL. The department staffs five response stations with a minimum of thirty-seven 
emergency responders on duty at all times. The high level of performance expected of 
LANL researchers translates to a commensurate expectation of LAFD. This expectation 
is written into a cooperative agreement between LAFD and DOE, which requires LAFD 
to be a “nuclear-grade” fire department that delivers “enhanced fire department 
services.”2 
The cooperative agreement defines the services the LAFD must deliver to LANL, 
including the “development and maintenance of pre-incident plans (PIPs) consistent with 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1620 standards for LANL buildings.”3 
Since at least 1995, outside evaluators representing DOE and the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA), or contractors representing LANL, have cited concerns 
with the LAFD’s pre-incident planning process. This thesis was designed to gain a better 
understanding of the problems associated with the LAFD pre-incident planning process 
and to identify potential solutions for process improvement. 
                                                 
1 “Our History,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, accessed October 8, 2017, http://lanl.gov/about/ 
history-innovation/index.php. 
2 National Nuclear Security Administration, “Cooperative Agreement No. DE-NA0002067” (internal 
document, County of Los Alamos, October 1, 2013). 
3 National Nuclear Security Administration. 
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The literature review examined NFPA standards and DOE orders related to pre-
incident planning. The NFPA 1620: Standard for Pre-incident Planning is quite 
comprehensive, but offered little advice relevant to pre-incident planning at a national 
laboratory; the standard does not take into account the processes or information 
protection needs of a national defense laboratory. DOE orders offered very few specifics 
related to pre-incident planning, though some orders did specifically call for a criticality 
expert to review pre-incident planning documents when appropriate. These orders also 
suggested that plans should be constructed and maintained to facilitate a collaborative 
effort. Specifically, input should be “complemented by input from the site fire protection 
engineering staff, facility subject matter experts, and emergency responders.”4 The 
literature review also examined best-practice articles from fire department trade journals. 
Many of the articles focused on introducing technology into the pre-incident planning 
process. Other written work reviewed included papers written by National Fire Academy 
students, and an after-action report from Charleston, South Carolina, that highlighted the 
grave consequences of inadequate pre-incident planning. The statute governing pre-
incident planning in the United Kingdom was also reviewed. This statute mandates 
participation in the planning process; collaboration is essentially forced upon any agency 
that would respond to an incident at a planned facility. Finally, the rapid decision-making 
process employed at emergency incidents was reviewed to illuminate how incidents are 
handled in stressful environments.  
Following the literature review, the thesis researcher assembled all past written 
evaluations of the LAFD pre-incident planning process. Findings across the twenty years 
of evaluations consistently called for more information in pre-incident plans and greater 
collaboration with LANL when developing and maintaining the plans. LAFD’s current 
pre-incident planning process was then evaluated; findings echoed the insufficient 
information and poor collaboration from LANL found in previous assessments. An 
additional finding not mentioned in previous assessments, however, was a significant 
problem with access to pre-incident plans on Toughbook laptop computers. Only 25 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Energy, Fire Protection, DOE-STD-1066-2012 (Washington, DC: DOE, 2012). 
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percent of the laptops that contained LAFD pre-incident plans could provide access to the 
information.  
Next, the thesis research examined best practices from fire departments that serve 
national laboratories and internationally accredited fire departments. Research showed 
that the pre-incident planning practices in these departments were worthy of 
benchmarking. The information in the plans was far more detailed than in LAFD plans 
and supporting graphics were far superior. The best-practice processes also exhibited 
greater collaboration with the facility staff. Another common best practice was 
categorizing pre-incident plans based on risk and hazards within the facility. The higher-
risk facilities received a more detailed pre-incident planning process. Facilities with 
fewer hazards received a limited pre-incident plan. These departments also set a 
minimum level for pre-incident planning, allowing them to forgo the planning process for 
lower-hazard buildings. By eliminating lower-hazard facilities from the pre-incident 
planning workload, planners could budget more time to improve plans for higher-hazard 
facilities.  
The research conclusion recommends increased collaboration between LAFD and 
LANL, and more reliable access to LAFD plans. New technology and paper copies for 
backup are specific recommendations for improving access. Further, LAFD—or any 
department working toward improvement—should use the best practices identified in this 
research to improve their pre-incident planning process; when implementing changes, 
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The Department of Energy (DOE) operates seventeen national laboratories across 
the United States. These laboratories conduct scientific research across a wide spectrum 
of topics, including the environment, health, computing, and national security. Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) focuses on national security. LANL was 
established in 1943, and its staff work to “provide the best scientific and engineering 
solutions to the nation’s most crucial security challenges.”1 LANL is infamously known 
as Site Y for the Manhattan Project: the newly established laboratory was asked to design 
and build the world’s first atomic bomb.  
The Los Alamos Fire Department (LAFD) provides emergency response services 
to LANL. The department staffs five response stations with a minimum of thirty-seven 
emergency responders on duty at all times. The high level of performance expected of 
LANL researchers translates to a commensurate expectation of LAFD. This expectation 
is written into a cooperative agreement between LAFD and DOE, which requires LAFD 
to be a “nuclear-grade” fire department that delivers “enhanced fire department 
services.”2 The terms “nuclear-grade” and “enhanced” clearly imply something beyond 
normal or average, but the agreement provides no guidance for precisely measuring these 
attributes.  
In an attempt to meet these high expectations, LAFD participates in the Center for 
Fire Accreditation International’s evaluation. Agencies that score high enough on this 
evaluation achieve accreditation. LAFD is one of fewer than 200 fire departments in the 
United States that are currently accredited.3 One of the core values in the accreditation 
process is continuous improvement.  
                                                 
1 “Our History,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, accessed October 8, 2017, http://lanl.gov/about/ 
history-innovation/index.php. 
2 National Nuclear Security Administration, “Cooperative Agreement No. DE-NA0002067” (internal 
document, County of Los Alamos, October 1, 2013). 
3 “About Accreditation & CFAI,” CPSE, accessed October 7, 2017, http://www.cpse.org/agency-
accreditation/about-accreditation-cfai.aspx. 
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Currently, LAFD’s pre-incident planning process needs improvement. Pre-
incident plans are generated for facilities that are at high risk for emergency situations or 
conduct unique hazardous operations. These plans are specific to one facility and can be 
published either electronically or on paper. The level of detail and the plan’s format 
varies between emergency response agencies. Emergency responders use the information 
contained in pre-incident plans to form strategies for combatting the response challenges 
associated with the specific facility.  
A cooperative agreement defines the services the LAFD must deliver to LANL, 
including the “development and maintenance of pre-incident plans (PIPs) consistent with 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1620 standards for LANL buildings.”4 
Since at least 1995, outside evaluators representing DOE and the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA), or contractors representing LANL, have cited concerns 
with the LAFD’s pre-incident planning process.  
Concerns have been primarily associated with the plans’ insufficient information. 
Evaluators have also stressed the need for LANL staff to be more involved in the 
development and maintenance of the plans. When an emergency occurs at a LANL 
facility, LAFD, a LANL emergency manager, and a representative from the affected 
facility must work together to manage the emergency. Each responder has a written 
emergency plan, but the three separate parties’ plans are not coordinated with the other 
groups’. This insufficient coordination prevents the responders from developing a 
common operating picture. The facility representative or LANL emergency manager may 
have information vital to LAFD; without this information, LAFD may make misinformed 
tactical decisions that come with grave consequences.  
Previous coordination attempts have been challenged by LANL facilities’ 
sensitive information. Some of the information LAFD needs to meet NFPA 1620 
requirements for LANL facility pre-incident plans might be categorized as “official use 
only” (OUO) or “unclassified controlled nuclear information” (UCNI). While outside 
evaluators have called for more information within LAFD plans, LANL has at the same 
                                                 
4 National Nuclear Security Administration, “Cooperative Agreement No. DE-NA0002067.” 
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time resisted sharing some facility-related information. This hesitation to share 
information is likely due to LAFD pre-incident plans being contained in a Los Alamos 
County–managed database rather than within the LANL database. All LAFD emergency 
responders must hold a DOE Q clearance, which is equivalent to a top-secret security 
clearance; this shows that the concern with releasing information is not related to the 
user. LANL officials who do not know enough about or trust the security of the Los 
Alamos County–owned database are not willing to jeopardize sensitive information 
related to LANL facilities. Solutions for more effective pre-incident planning will need to 
identify ways to improve collaboration, determine proper level of information detail, and 
protect any sensitive information included in the pre-incident plans.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis research set out to answer the following questions: 
• What can be done to improve the LAFD pre-incident planning process?  
• What information should be included in LAFD pre-incident plans to 
ensure they are consistent with NFPA standards and DOE orders?  
• What are the common or best practices that other fire departments are 
using to ensure their pre-incident plans are consistent with NFPA 
standards and DOE orders?  
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis provides a prescription for changes to the LAFD pre-incident planning 
process that will improve the process and satisfy the needs of outside evaluators who are 
charged with periodically evaluating the pre-incident planning process. The thesis 
development relied on the policy analysis process described by Bardach and Patashnik.5 
When selecting pre-incident planning process best practices, the researcher followed 
guidance from Bardach and Patashnik’s “Smart Practices Research” chapter.6 Without a 
national fire department ranking system to guide the selection of “best practices,” the 
author requested pre-incident planning practices data from other national laboratories and 
                                                 
5 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to 
More Effective Problem Solving, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2016). 
6 Bardach and Patashnik, 125. 
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internationally accredited fire departments. The author made three separate direct email 
requests for information to multiple DOE national laboratory sites. Responding 
laboratories included Idaho National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Data related to the pre-incident planning program at 
SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory was derived from a presentation delivered during 
the annual Department of Energy emergency management conference held in Las Vegas 
on May 22–25, 2017, which the author attended. The presentation was given by the 
laboratory’s assistant fire marshal, Lance Lougee.7 References to the SLAC pre-incident 
planning program are derived from the author’s recollection of the conference 
presentation.  
The research process was designed to create viable recommendations for 
significant improvements to the current LAFD pre-incident planning program. The 
recommendations act as a road map for the development, deployment, and maintenance 
of LAFD’s pre-incident plans for LANL. The recommendations could also apply to other 
agencies with similar responsibilities to provide emergency services to high-value, high-
hazard facilities like LANL. 
The intended consumer of this thesis is LAFD leadership and similar emergency 
response agencies; the thesis is designed to help them establish effective pre-incident 
plans. The author hopes that this thesis and its recommendations will garner measurable 
improvements in LAFD’s pre-incident planning process. 
To gather evidence necessary for the policy analysis, the author reviewed 
literature related to pre-incident planning practices found in trade journals and scholarly 
work from the National Fire Academy. The author also examined LAFD’s current pre-
incident planning process, past evaluations of LAFD planning practices, and best-practice 
examples from other national laboratories and accredited fire departments. The current 
LAFD pre-incident planning process was then compared to an aggregate of best 
practices. Specific recommendations for improving the LAFD pre-incident planning 
process seek to close the gap between the current planning process and best practices. 
                                                 
7 Lance Lougee, “Pre-incident Planning for SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory” (presentation, 
Emergency Management Issues Special Interest Group Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, NV, May 24, 2017). 
 5 
Other fire departments can also use these findings as a model to compare their pre-
incident planning process to best practices. 
C. UPCOMING CHAPTERS  
The upcoming chapters begin with a review of literature related to pre-incident 
planning in Chapter II. Chapter III presents previous evaluations of LAFD’s pre-incident 
planning process and establishes common themes. Chapter IV describes and evaluates 
LAFD’s current pre-incident planning process. Chapter V presents best practices in pre-
incident planning used by other fire departments, and Chapter VI includes an analysis of 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review examines pre-incident planning literature applicable to LAFD’s 
emergency response for LANL. The review focuses on four primary areas: gaining a 
greater understanding of NFPA standards and DOE orders related to pre-incident 
planning, identifying best or common pre-incident planning practices, reviewing similar 
pre-incident process improvement efforts in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
and briefly examining how this information is used for decision making during an 
emergency response.  
A. PRE-INCIDENT PLANNING STANDARDS AND ORDERS 
In 1987, a large loss fire in an Ohio warehouse sparked the need for a fire 
department–wide standard for pre-incident planning.8 In the aftermath of the fire, 
representatives from the fire service and insurance industry held a series of meetings that 
eventually led to NFPA Standard 1420: Recommended Practice for Pre-incident 
Planning for Warehouse Occupancies.9 This first pre-incident planning standard was 
adopted by NFPA in 1993. The standard was expanded in 1998 to include all occupancies 
and was renumbered as NFPA 1620; the title was also amended, to Recommended 
Practice for Pre-incident Planning.10 The standard was updated in 2003, 2010, and 2015.  
NFPA 1620 was developed by a committee comprising a chairperson, twenty-six 
committee members, and seven alternates. The committee chair worked for a Bristol-
Myers Squibb company; most of the committee members and all of the alternates hailed 
from business or industry, including many who represented insurance companies. Only 
five of the thirty-four committee members or alternates were from fire departments or 
emergency response agencies. None of the members appear to have been connected to a 
DOE national laboratory. Chapter 1 of this standard clearly indicates that the document is 
                                                 
8 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), NFPA 1620: Standard for Pre-incident Planning 
(Quincy, MA: NFPA, 2015). 
9 NFPA, NFPA 1420: Recommended Practice for Pre-incident Planning for Warehouse Occupancies 
(Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1993). 
10 NFPA, NFPA 1620. 
 8 
intended “for use by personnel responding to emergencies.”11 It is therefore surprising to 
see how few of the document’s committee members represented emergency response 
agencies. Without observing the committee in action, it is not possible to know if the 
small number of responders created bias; however, the committee’s composition does call 
the standard’s perspectives and represented interests into question. A literature search 
yielded no evidence that the committee’s makeup has been previously questioned or 
discussed (at least not in a searchable media format).  
The NFPA 1620 standard provides suggestions for developing a pre-incident plan, 
describes the necessary contents of a pre-incident plan, and explains how to test a pre-
incident plan. The document also discusses how to determine jurisdictional authority. In 
annex A, section A.1.3.3, the standard indicates that if a fire department voluntarily 
adopts NFPA 1620 as a standard, then the head of that fire department, or designee, is 
considered the jurisdictional authority. In this same section, the standard indicates that if 
NFPA 1620 is legally adopted by a federal, state, or local government body that has 
regulatory authority over the responding fire department, then that governmental body is 
considered the jurisdictional authority. This distinction is important because the entity 
with jurisdictional authority has the final say about what should and should not be 
contained within pre-incent planning documents.  
NFPA 1620—in annex A, section A.1.3.5—recommends that if confidential 
information cannot be protected, the information can be given to the emergency 
responders once they arrive on scene. Some of the information needed for the LANL pre-
incident planning documents is considered confidential. While NFPA 1620 contains a 
large volume of significant information, it does not mention with any specificity a 
national research laboratory that contains radiological, explosive, biological, and 
chemical hazards. It does speak to classifying laboratories and suggests that each case 
should be reviewed individually.  
                                                 
11 NFPA, 5. 
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NFPA 1620 stresses the need to understand the pre-incident plan’s intended 
audience. In annex A, section A.4.6, the standard clearly identifies emergency responders 
as the plan’s primary audience. This section furthermore states:  
It is critical that the information presented be relevant, clear, concise, and 
complete. It is unlikely that emergency responders will have the time to 
read extensive text. Information should be presented graphically (sketches 
and pictures) whenever possible. Information that will not be of use to the 
emergency responders should be reserved for other uses and should not be 
allowed to clutter the pre-incident plan.12  
LAFD responders have traditionally resisted lengthy pre-incident plan documents, while 
DOE and NNSA representatives have consistently called for more detailed information in 
LAFD pre-incident plans.13 
The DOE mentions pre-incident planning in DOE Order 420.1C, Facility Safety, 
and in DOE Standard 1066, Fire Protection. Order 420.1C requires that pre-incident 
plans are “established to enhance the effectiveness of manual fire suppression 
activities.”14 This order also requires a criticality subject-matter expert to review manual 
firefighting methods that involve water when the suppression could occur within or 
adjacent to a moderation-controlled area. DOE Order 420.1C does not specifically 
reference NFPA 1620 as a guide for pre-incident planning, but it does proclaim that 
requirements within 420.1C take precedence over all NFPA requirements. DOE Standard 
1066 specifically mandates that planners utilize NFPA 1620 when developing pre-
incident plans. Further, Standard 1066 indicates that pre-incident plan development 
guided by NFPA 1620 should be “complemented by input from the site fire protection 
engineering staff, facility subject matter experts, and emergency responders.”15 Standard 
1066 also cautions that planners should consider the potential for firefighting delays 
caused by security and nuclear concerns.  
                                                 
12 NFPA, 17. 
13 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Fire Suppression and Related Service at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, DOE/IG-0821 (Washington, DC: DOE, 2009), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/igprod/ 
documents/IG-0821.pdf. 
14 DOE, Facility Safety, DOE O 420.1C (Washington, DC: DOE, 2015). 
15 DOE, Fire Protection. 
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NFPA 1620 provides great detail regarding pre-incident plan development. DOE 
Orders 420.1 C and 1066, however, provide limited detail; DOE order 420.1C contains 
only three sentences related to pre-incident planning. Nevertheless, the specific 
requirement for a criticality safety review within or adjacent to moderator-controlled 
areas must be incorporated into LAFD’s plans.16 Similarly, DOE Order 1066 contains 
only two sentences of related text, but requires “input from the site fire protection 
engineering staff, facility subject matter experts, and emergency responders.”17  
B. BEST/COMMON PRE-INCIDENT PLANNING PRACTICES  
Although there is no generally accepted list of pre-incident planning practices, a 
number of authorities have described different best-practice models for fire departments 
and other emergency response organizations. According to Lacey and Valentine, who 
write for Firehouse magazine, “Pre-incident planning allows emergency responders to 
anticipate the resources and procedures needed to meet specific demands within their 
jurisdictions.”18 They concisely define the pre-incident planning process as gathering and 
evaluating information, developing procedures, and keeping the information current.19 
Lacey and Valentine also recommend that response crews tour the facilities (known as a 
“walk-down”) while gathering pre-incident plan data to become more familiar with the 
facility’s response needs and challenges. 
According to Lacey and Valentine, pre-incident planning consists of four separate 
functions: 
1. Developing positive relationships with building owner/occupants, 
2. Conducting pre-incident surveys, 
3. Managing pre-incident data, and 
4. Developing pre-incident plans. 
                                                 
16 DOE, Facility Safety, II-6. 
17 DOE, Fire Protection, 33. 
18 Brett Lacey and Paul Valentine, “Fire Prevention and the Link to Pre-incident Planning,” 
Firehouse, May 6, 2009, http://www.firehouse.com/article/10471881/fire-prevention-and-the-link-to-pre-
incident-planning. 
19 Lacey and Valentine. 
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They go on to warn that—as responders will be the ones using the plans—responders 
should be responsible for developing pre-incident plans. Although prevention staff should 
assist in the development of the plans, the authors stress that the end-user should drive 
development. In a concluding note, Lacey and Valentine claim that when departments are 
short staffed, pre-incident planning becomes a lower priority despite its importance to the 
responders’ scene safety.20 
In a Carolina Fire Rescue EMS Journal article, retired New York City firefighter 
Dennis Amodio makes specific recommendations for pre-incident planning.21 Amodio 
argues that all pre-incident plans should begin with the building’s floor plans. He 
suggests that computer-aided design drawings may already be available for many 
buildings, and can be easily incorporated into pre-incident plans, along with photos and 
videos of the building. He additionally mentions that security camera video feeds can be 
a resource for responders when a digital format is used in pre-planning. Amodio notes 
that pre-incident plans can contain a vast amount of difficult-to-obtain data, but suggests 
that for-hire companies specialize in this type of work for staffs that do not have the 
resources to compile the information on their own. He further recommends that pre-plans 
should be utilized in training to build familiarity with the building.  
In a 2010 article for Firehouse magazine, Bob Galvin examined several fire 
departments that had successfully incorporated automated technology into the 
development and maintenance of their pre-incident plans.22 Galvin notes that the 
Holland, Michigan, Fire Department had been successfully using First Look Pro, a CAD 
Zone software, since 2007. This pre-incident planning software is linked to a dispatching 
software, which allows pre-incident planning information for the building to be 
concurrently displayed with dispatch information on a mobile data terminal screen. This 
is a time-saving step for the responders: because the pre-incident plan is automatically 
                                                 
20 Lacey and Valentine. 
21 Dennis Amodio, “An Introduction to Pre-planning for Fire Calls,” Carolina Fire Rescue EMS 
Journal, April 23, 2012, http://www.carolinafirejournal.com/Articles/Article-Detail/ArticleId/2073/An-
introduction-to-Pre-Planning-for-fire-calls. 
22 Bob Galvin, “Sharing Pre-plan Data to Improve Responses,” Firehouse, May 5, 2010, 
http://www.firehouse.com/article/10467274/sharing-pre-plan-data-to-improve-responses. 
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displayed, they do not need to look it up separately. Holland Fire Department has also 
incorporated a mapping software called First Look Pro Map (also from CAD Zone). This 
mapping program calculates the quickest route to the location of the emergency and uses 
a vehicle-locator GPS system to show the progress of the responding apparatus on the 
displayed map. The responding fire chief can see the location of all units en route to the 
emergency, which allows the chief to begin assigning specific tasks to each unit 
depending upon their arrival order. The mapping software, Galvin totes, provides 
responders an enhanced ability to locate buildings that do not outwardly display a 
physical address.  
In the same Firehouse article, Galvin describes how the Keizer, Oregon, Fire 
District has been using automated pre-plans since 2005. Keizer uses a program called 
Firehouse Mobile Preplans, developed by FIREHOUSE Software.23 Similar to the 
Holland Fire Department’s pre-planning software, this software is also linked to 
dispatching software and automatically displays the pre-incident plan on the responding 
apparatus’s mobile data terminal. This software also has an audible play feature, which 
can read the pre-plan information out loud through a computer-generated voice while 
responders are en route to the location. Dispatchers can also access this same pre-plan 
information, giving them the ability to relay known hazards to the responders who may 
not have time to review the pre-plan while en route.  
In a thesis titled “Collaborative Radiological Response Planning,” homeland 
security master’s student Elaine C. Roman explored radiological response planning.24 
She strongly recommends following the capabilities-based planning model, which is 
known for its flexibility.25 Roman does not discuss this model’s origin, and a literature 
search—though it found the model referenced by many authors—did not reveal its 
original inventor either. The eight sequential steps in the capabilities-based planning 
model are: 
                                                 
23 Galvin. 
24 Elaine C. Roman, “Collaborative Radiological Response Planning” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2013), 3, http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/39002. 
25 Roman, 29. 
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1. Convene a working group 
2. Determine capability requirements 
3. Assess current capability levels 
4. Identify, analyze, and choose options 
5. Update plans and strategies 
6. Allocate funds 
7. Update and execute program plans 
8. Assess and report 
According to Roman, the plan is not effective if the steps are taken out of order. Once the 
planners have completed all eight steps, they should never need to repeat steps 1 and 2 
for a single pre-incident plan unless the planning environment (or the emergency being 
planned for) has changed significantly. The model further requires a diverse planning-
process group. Roman’s recommendations are not specific to any single jurisdiction or 
region, but were tailored to a generalized planning process for radiological response 
events. She advises that when planning for emergency response, planners must first 
consider the risk associated with the hazard and then determine the assets necessary to 
respond to the event. Roman acknowledges that “long-term culture, system, and habits” 
can make change difficult, but enhanced coordination and information sharing among 
involved response agencies can overcome these challenges.26 Her recommendations 
directly support the DOE Order 1066 requirement to have both emergency responders 
and non-responders as a significant part of the pre-incident plan development process.  
C. EMERGENCY PLANNING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Emergency responders in the United Kingdom have a comprehensive emergency 
planning process required by the Civil Contingencies Act. This act defines an 
“emergency” and pre-planning requirements.27 The act gives the Minister of the Crown 
or Scottish ministers authority to order planning information, as well as to order 
                                                 
26 Roman, 42. 
27 Civil Contingencies Act 2004, c. 36, Parliament of the United Kingdom (November 18, 2004), 4, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/pdfs/ukpga_20040036_en.pdf. 
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collaboration or cooperation in the development of a pre-planning document.28 The act 
also requires agencies to disclose pre-planning information upon request; agencies that do 
not comply with the request “may [face] proceedings in the High Court.”29 The terms of 
the Civil Contingencies Act are further defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 
Enhancement Programme. The UK Programme guidance resembles NFPA standards. 
Their “Chapter 2 Co-operation” document specifies that agencies with emergency 
response responsibilities must create emergency plans cooperatively with other agencies 
that may respond to the same incident, through the formation of a Local Resilience 
Forum.30 An offshoot of this forum is a sub-group called the Strategic Co-ordinating 
Group (SCG). The response agency’s top management must participate in the forum, 
while operations-level management must participate in the SCG.  
The Programme’s “Chapter 5” guidance document provides even more specific 
direction for emergency planning. UK emergency plans are classified as generic, specific, 
or site specific, as well as by agency involvement levels—there are single agency, multi-
agency, and multi-level plans.31 Generic plans are primarily single-agency plans that 
resemble U.S.-style standard operating procedures and are not specific to a location. One 
example might be a plan for a single-family residential structure fire. The plan provides a 
somewhat standard set of operating rules for responses of the defined nature, regardless 
of the incident location. Specific plans are more detailed and are designed for a specific 
incident. A standard operating procedure for fighting a pyrophoric metal fire in a glove 
box containment system at LANL, for instance, would be a specific plan. Site-specific 
plans are another form of specific plans. They are used in the United Kingdom for major 
industrial hazard sites, such as gas and oil pipelines and nuclear power stations. UK 
                                                 
28 Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 8. 
29 Civil Contingencies Act 2004, 10. 
30 Cabinet Office, “Chapter 2 Co-operation: Revision to Emergency Preparedness,” Contingencies 
Act Enhancement Programme, March 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/61025/Chapter-2-Co-operation-revised-March-2012.pdf. 
31 Cabinet Office, “Chapter 5 (Emergency Planning): Revision to Emergency Preparedness,” Civil 
Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme, October 2011, 11, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61028/Emergency_Preparedness_chapter5_amends_21112011.pdf. 
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nuclear power stations are subject to Defense Major Accident Control Regulations.32 
These regulations are similar to DOE/NNSA regulations in the United States.  
If a UK-style regulatory system were implemented for LANL, it would place 
more emphasis on pre-incident planning. Having high-level management involved in the 
planning process might help ensure that pre-incident planning is a priority within the 
organization. The UK requirement to collaborate and share information would further 
ensure that when multiple agencies—like LAFD, LANL emergency management teams, 
and LANL facility representatives—respond, they would do so in a coordinated manner, 
and with knowledge of the other responders’ responsibilities. The UK information 
disclosure requirement would ensure LAFD pre-plans contain adequate information to 
support an emergency response. Although a pre-planning legislative act similar to the 
United Kingdom’s may not be possible in the United States, LANL could create a policy 
document that illustrates and requires, by internal rules, the provision of information and 
collaborator efforts in the pre-incident planning process. 
D. REPORTS ON PRE-INCIDENT PLANNING IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS 
This section examines pre-incident planning reviews written by students from the 
National Fire Academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program between 2002 and 2010, as 
well as other similar documents; one report details the tragic outcome of an ineffective 
pre-incident planning process.  
(1) Greensboro, North Carolina 
One National Fire Academy research project studied pre-incident planning in 
Greensboro, North Carolina. This study revealed recommended linking pre-incident 
planning software with a mapping program.33 The Greensboro study also noted that a 
pre-incident plan should provide information to the incident commander that cannot be 
viewed from a command post. The study further suggested that pre-incident plans should 
be simple, and emphasized that too much information is just as damaging as too little 
                                                 
32 Cabinet Office, 34. 
33 David Bullins, “Pre-incident Planning in the 21st Century” (research project, National Fire 
Academy, 2002), 13, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=8887. 
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information. The Greensboro study noted the importance of standardized drawings and a 
formal guideline or general operating procedure to guide plans’ development and 
maintenance. The project author suggests using NFPA 170, Standard for Fire Safety 
Symbols, as a guideline for standardizing symbols used in pre-incident plan drawings. 
(2) Fayetteville, North Carolina  
Another report, studying the Fayetteville, North Carolina, pre-incident planning 
process, also recommended that responders incorporate technology into pre-incident 
plans. The author suggested connecting GPS technology and a computer-aided 
dispatching system to the pre-plan.34 
(3) Savannah, Georgia 
A study on Savannah, Georgia, focused on expanding the pre-incident planning 
process for special hazards. Many LANL facilities would be considered special hazards. 
This research noted, “The plan should not attempt to specify detailed, explicit actions to 
be taken during an actual incident. Rather, the plan should provide the information 
necessary to allow emergency responder to make informed decision based on actual 
scene conditions.”35 Other recommendations were to utilize a data worksheet to collect 
information about special hazards and to identify resources available from other response 
agencies. 
(4) Henrico County, Virginia  
Like the other studies, the study that examined Henrico County, Virginia, called 
for standardizing the pre-incident planning process.36 The researcher noted significant 
variations between departmental pre-plans’ quality and scope and attributed this variance 
to a lack of uniform direction. Like the Savannah study, this study also pointed out that 
                                                 
34 Bullins, 55. 
35 Anthony Faust, “Model to Expand the Special Hazards/Processes Criteria of Savannah Fire & 
Emergency Services’ Pre-incident Planning Guidelines” (research paper, National Fire Academy, 2009), 
16, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=692131. 
36 Anthony E. McDowell, “Requirements for Implementing a Pre-incident Planning Software System 
in the Henrico County (Va) Division of Fire” (research paper, National Fire Academy, 2008), 37, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683014. 
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too much information within the pre-plan can prevent the user from surmising or locating 
the most critical information. Like others, this study recommended integrating pre-
incident planning with mapping programs, and further suggested including plume 
modeling and evacuation routes. As in the Greensboro study, the Henrico study 
mentioned using standardized symbols for drawings in pre-incident plans. Finally, the 
researcher recommended that evaluators consider the speed of data access when 
reviewing the planning processes.37 
(5) Baltimore, Maryland  
Due to the sheer size of the department (1,800 members) and its budget ($129 
million), one might expect the Baltimore City Fire Department to have more advanced 
pre-incident planning processes when compared to other departments.38 A study of the 
department’s planning process, however, made strong recommendations for needed 
improvement.39 The department has mobile data terminals installed in its response units, 
but they are primarily only used to obtain the address of the dispatched location. The 
study author suggested incorporating the pre-incident planning program into the mobile 
data terminals. The study noted the importance of reviewing pre-incident plans annually, 
and suggested that data collection and entry should happen the company level; if the 
responders who depend on the information are responsible for inputting the data, the 
author suggested, the data quality may improve. The study also recommended that the 
fire department share planning information with other response agencies, referencing the 
Canby, Oregon, Fire Department, which shares its information with law enforcement 
agencies and other stakeholders.40 
                                                 
37 McDowell, 39. 
38 Staff and budget numbers reflect 2010 data; Jeffery R. Segal, “Pre-incident Surveys in the 
Baltimore City Fire Department” (research paper, National Fire Academy, 2010), 7.  
39 Seal, 43. 
40 Segal, 41. 
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(6) Charleston, South Carolina  
On June 18, 2007, nine Charleston, South Carolina, Fire Department responders 
lost their lives in a large furniture store fire. After this tragic loss, the city of Charleston 
commissioned a special investigative report to determine the cause of the catastrophe and 
prevent a similar event from happening in the future.41 The report cited pre-incident 
planning failures on the part of the Charleston Fire Department as a contributing factor to 
the lives lost. Specifically, the report cited an incomplete pre-fire plan that was 
furthermore unavailable to on-scene commanders. Although the pre-plan included 
drawings of the building, the drawings did not show all portions of the building and did 
not indicate fire walls and fire separations. The most recent pre-fire plan for the building 
at the time had been completed on April 26, 2006—just over one year prior to the fire—
but the plan did not specify that the building was constructed using lightweight metal 
trusses, which collapsed during the fire, trapping and killing several firefighters.42 The 
incident report made several specific recommendations for pre-fire planning within the 
Charleston Fire Department. The report recommended a more “systematic pre-fire 
planning process” that would familiarize responders with the hazards in pre-planned 
buildings.43 The report also stressed making the pre-plan information readily available to 
on-scene commanders.  
E. DECISION MAKING UNDER PRESSURE 
A pre-incident plan is essentially a collection of information. To establish how 
much information should be included in a pre-incident plan, and in what format, this 
subsection briefly examines how information is used to make decisions during an 
emergency.  
                                                 
41 J. Gordon Routley et al., “Firefighter Fatality Investigative Report—Sofa Super Store, 1807 
Savannah Highway, Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007,” Iowa Department of Public Safety, 2008, 
http://www.dps.state.ia.us/fm/fstb/NewWebStuff2012/TrainingResources/PDFs/PhaseIIReport.pdf. 
42 Routley et al., 106. 
43 Routley et al., 143. 
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In 1985, Gary Klein et al. conducted a study to explore fire commanders’ 
decision-making processes.44 The study examined experienced decision makers who 
make life-and-death decisions under extreme time pressure. During this study, Klein et al. 
worked with twenty-six experienced fire ground commanders, each of whom had, on 
average, twenty-three years of experience. The authors looked at 156 critical decision 
points and found that, 80 percent of the time, these commanders used their experience to 
identify the situation as a standard prototype and then applied a typical or standard 
solution.45 The data collected during the study was used to construct the “recognition-
primed decision-making model.” 
The Klein et al. study found that in time-pressure situations like those a fire 
ground commander faces, “concurrent evaluation is probably impossible.”46 Having 
examined experienced fire ground commanders, the study then looked to perceptual 
learning. Due to a person’s experiences over time, perceptual learning results in a long-
term perception change. For example, a fire officer who uses a computer-simulated 
model to practice various response strategies for a building fire will experience various 
outcomes after each simulation; over time the fire officer learns to select strategies that 
produce the desired outcomes. Prototype development is like conditioning; experience, 
over time, will condition a person to react automatically when faced with familiar stimuli. 
Klein et al. found that prototype development was primarily based upon experience and 
could not be augmented easily through written text, such as pre-incident plans. When the 
fire ground commanders faced unfamiliar situations with no clear prototype, they resorted 
to imagery: the commanders tried to predict the outcome of a particular strategy to decide 
if that option would work, or if they should select another. The study found that 78 
percent of the decisions studied were made in less than one minute.47 Klein describes the 
recognition-primed decision-making model as “a blend of intuition (the prototype 
                                                 
44 Gary Klein, Roberta Calderwood, and Anne Clinton-Cirocco, “Rapid Decision Making on the Fire 
Ground: The Original Study Plus a Postscript,” Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 4, 
no. 3 (September 21, 2010): 186–209, https://doi.org/10.1518/155534310X12844000801203. 
45 Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, 7. 
46 Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, 199. 
47 Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, 192. 
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matches, which today would be described as pattern-matching) and analysis (the mental 
stimulation).”48  
Other studies have also found that when critical decisions must be made under 
extreme time constraints, the decision makers tend to rely on intuition or gut reactions. A 
study by the Leeds University Business School also noted that a coping strategy for time 
pressure decisions is to “Do what you did previously in similar situations.”49 This coping 
strategy aligns with Klein et al.’s findings about prototypes or pattern matching for time-
pressure decision making. The Leeds study indicated that these time-pressure decisions 
can be “outside the normal operating range” and can lead to “extreme states such as 
panic.”50  
F. CONCLUSION  
This literature review of pre-incident planning practices has examined existing 
gaps in standards and orders, including a lack of specific direction regarding planning for 
a national nuclear laboratory complex. The reports related to common practices showed 
that readily available research on pre-incident planning generally responds to failing 
systems that need to be enhanced. Research regarding rapid decision making for the fire 
service is limited, but does clearly indicate that most critical fire ground operational 
decisions are made in less than sixty seconds, which means that critical information in the 
pre-incident plan must be easily and quickly attained.  
                                                 
48 Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, 207. 
49 A. J. Maule and I. Andrade, “The Effects of Time Pressure on Decision Making: How Harassed 
Managers Cope,” in IEE Colloquium on Decision Making and Problem Solving, 1997, 4/4, 
https://doi.org/10.1049/ic:19971220. 
50 Maule and Andrade, 4/3. 
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III. PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS OF LAFD PRE-INCIDENT 
PLANNING 
LAFD records document several previous evaluations of the LAFD pre-incident 
plan program. This chapter reviews those past evaluations in aggregate to identify 
common themes or continuing trends.  
A. 1995: BEATTY, HARVEY AND ASSOCIATES 
The oldest evaluation on file was a 1995 DOE/NNSA-contracted study of LAFD 
services and resources conducted by Beatty, Harvey & Associates.51 This study 
examined emergency services provided to LANL and made four specific pre-incident 
planning recommendations: 
• Pre-fire planning and training should be site specific. 
• LAFD should conduct realistic drills to test pre-fire plans. 
• LAFD pre-fire plans should contain additional site-specific information. 
• Pre-fire planning for all significant LANL facilities should be complete 
and should include more information.52  
Within this same report, the authors noted that pre-fire planning had 
“advanced.”53 In spite of this noted improvement, they criticized the pre-fire plans for 
lack of depth and understanding about site-specific hazards, indicating that emergency 
drills were not realistic and failed to test pre-fire planning concepts. 
B. 2004: HUGHES ASSOCIATES, INC.  
In June 2004, DOE/NNSA contracted with Hughes Associates, Inc., which 
authored a report titled Needs Assessment Fire Prevention and Suppression Services and 
                                                 
51 Beatty, Harvey & Associates, Needs Assessment for Fire Department Services and Resources, 
LANL Contract No. B 000720015-35 (Los Alamos, NM: LANL, 1995). 
52 Beatty, Harvey & Associates, 43. 
53 Beatty, Harvey & Associates, 43. 
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Resources.54 This report was also critical of the LAFD’s pre-fire plans. The report 
specifically noted that “pre-fire plans did not accurately reflect the sum of known hazards 
to the responders.”55 The authors recommended that facility management be more 
involved in the development of pre-fire plans to ensure that hazards are clearly identified 
for responders.56 This report also recommended that LAFD be provided facility tours at 
least once every two years and suggested that pre-fire plans could be updated as needed 
following the tours.57 
C. 2009: LOS ALAMOS SITE OFFICE 
In 2009, multiple reports evaluated LAFD’s pre-fire planning. A DOE/NNSA Los 
Alamos Site Office report indicated that LAFD pre-fire planning procedures were 
“established and well-founded,” but also improvements for responder safety.58 The report 
specifically noted a shortage of special firefighting techniques related to LANL facilities’ 
unique materials. The report authors expected “more evidence of improved pre-incident 
plans in 2010.”59 
D. 2009: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INSPECTOR GENERAL 
In a September 2009 report titled Fire Suppression and Related Services at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, the DOE Office of Inspector General suggested substantial 
improvements for the LAFD pre-incident plans.60 Inspector Friedman expressed that the 
plans should contain more information and must be revised to consider: 
 
                                                 
54 Hughes Associates, Needs Assessment Fire Prevention and Suppression Services and Resources 
(Los Alamos, NM: LANL, 2004). 
55 Hughes Associates, 158. 
56 Beatty, Harvey & Associates, Needs Assessment, 158. 
57 Beatty, Harvey & Associates, 158. 
58 William Gentile and Dennis Urban, “Fiscal Year 2009, Los Alamos Site Office Assessment of the 
Los Alamos Fire Department, Incident Command System, Pre-incident Plans, Response Procedures,” 
(Review, DOE/NNSA, 2009). 
59 Gentile and Urban, 24. 
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• Scenarios: Information used to anticipate likely scenarios; 
• Extinguishment: Any unusual material or methods required for 
extinguishing fires; 
• Exposures: A list of any buildings and/or other features that might be 
affected in an emergency situation; 
• Equipment response: The equipment that would normally be used for 
response to each facility, as well as any special equipment that might be 
needed, including backup equipment for second-alarm responses; 
• Plan of attack: The positioning of each fire engine and any special 
information necessary for attacking fire in the buildings; and 
• Entry: A list of all entrances to the building.61 
Inspector Friedman also indicated deficiencies related to radioactive materials. He stated 
the pre-plans failed to identify 
• Radioactive materials as a fire hazard, 
• The exact locations of the radioactive materials, or 
• Guidelines for extinguishing specific radioactive materials.62 
Freidman found that LAFD pre-incident plans did not incorporate criticality safety 
controls for firefighting in areas within or adjacent to moderator-controlled areas.63 
Friedman also noted the DOE/NNSA site office’s poor attention to the pre-incident 
planning process. He also referenced NFPA 1620, indicating that the head of the 
DOE/NNSA Los Alamos site office should be considered the “authority having 
jurisdiction” and should therefore be responsible for “[determining] the level of planning 
appropriate for the jurisdiction and the property being pre-planned.” The report found no 
evidence over an eleven-year period that DOE/NNSA had provided any developmental 
guidance to LAFD for pre-incident plans. 
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62 Friedman, 6. 
63 Friedman, 6. 
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E. 2009: BASELINE NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
Later in 2009, a report titled Baseline Needs Assessment, Fire Prevention and 
Suppression Services and Resources evaluated LAFD pre-incident plans at nine different 
high-hazard LANL facilities.64 The evaluation first applauded several elements of the 
reviewed pre-incident plans; all the plans 
• contained a significant level of information regarding the facility’s fire-
protection systems, 
• informed the user of general hazards, 
• provided essential contact information, and 
• included basic information regarding vehicle approaches, as well as 
summary descriptions of building geometry.65 
This report also noted, however, issues the plans did not address, including: 
• nuclear facility hazard category, 
• radiation contamination potential, 
• criticality concerns/potential, 
• water use restrictions (moderator-controlled areas), 
• approximate building population, 
• personnel assembly areas, 
• presence of gloveboxes and laboratory hoods, 
• appropriate use of specialized firefighting agents,  
• confinement ventilation considerations, 
• presence of HEPA filters, 
• firefighting techniques for HEPA filter/plenum fires, 
• techniques and expectations for containing firefighting water runoff, 
                                                 
64 Robert J. Farris and Stephan D. Thorne, “Baseline Needs Assessment, Fire Prevention and 
Suppression Services and Resources” (review, LANL, 2009). 
65 Farris and Thorne, 117–18. 
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• strategies for manual firefighting, including hose lays, use of hydrants and 
standpipes, and access limitations, or 
• compensatory plans for responding to a facility with an impaired or 
degraded water supply.66 
The authors stressed the importance of “extensive facility review and support from 
nuclear facility management” to ensure the effectiveness of LAFD pre-incident plans. 
They also suggested that pre-incident plans include defensive firefighting tactics for 
deactivated facilities. The report closed its commentary on LAFD pre-incident plans by 
noting the importance of LANL facility tours, by which specific hazard mitigation can be 
incorporated into the LAFD pre-incident plans.  
In reviewing reports from 2009 and earlier, several clear patterns. One is that 
plans contained insufficient information, primarily related to special hazards or 
operations within the facility. A second and even more critical pattern is the need for 
LANL facility subject-matter experts to be more involved in pre-incident plan 
development. The call for greater involvement from LANL staff echoes Roman’s 
recommendations regarding the capabilities-based planning model, and aligns with the 
statutory requirements for collaborative planning in the United Kingdom. 
F. 2011: LOS ALAMOS SITE OFFICE 
In September 2011, the Los Alamos DOE/NNSA site office reviewed LAFD pre-
incident plans.67 In total the DOE/NNSA reviewed seven plans, all of which were 
approved. The report author listed only one deficiency with LAFD pre-incident plans; 
however, the report indicates, “This issue was effectively closed by LAFD, and as such, 
is consistent with the expectations of the evaluation criterion.”68 
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G. 2013: DOE OFFICE OF ENTERPRISE ASSESSMENTS 
In October 2013, DOE’s Office of Enterprise Assessments reviewed the fire 
protection program at LANL, including LAFD’s pre-incident plans. The report was 
critical of LAFD for failing to provide sufficient information. Notably, the pre-incident 
plans did not include floor plans, the locations of fire walls, fire alarm panels, fire 
detection systems, or the location of flammable liquid storage cabinets.69 
H. 2014: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
In April 2014, the DOE/NNSA issued an evaluative report titled, Report for the 
LANL Fire Protection Program Triennial Independent Assessment.70 One of the report’s 
findings mentioned LAFD pre-incident plans: “Contrary to DOE O 420.1B and NFPA 
1620, Pre-Incident Plans for LANL do not provide necessary information to support 
timely and effective response to the Laboratory.”71 Although the report did not provide 
clarification, it mentioned this this observation when discussing emergency vehicle 
access to facilities with security gates during power outages. 
I. 2014: BASELINE NEEDS ASSESSMENT  
Again in 2014, an October report about LANL fire protection needs identified 
several LAFD pre-incident planning deficiencies.72 For instance, the report indicated that 
the LAFD fire chief’s directive regarding pre-incident plans conflicted with DOE orders, 
and was furthermore not being implemented. The fire chief’s directive called for specific 
requirements in pre-incident plans, such as the inclusion of floor plans, that were missing 
from LAFD’s pre-incident plans.73 The report was also critical of LAFD for failing to 
update plans as recommended by LANL staff. 
                                                 
69 Office of Enterprise Assessments, “Office of Enterprise Assessments Review of the Fire Protection 
Program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory” (review, DOE, 2014), 7. 
70 John A. Krepps, “Report for the LANL Fire Protection Program Triennial Independent 
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72 Farris and Thorne, “Baseline Needs Assessment,” 105. 
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and Resources” (review, LANL, 2014), 105. 
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The report expressed further concern about pre-incident plans related to a May 
2014 fire in LANL Technical Area 53. Even though the report specifically notes that the 
authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) had not approved the LAFD pre-incident planning 
process, it states, “LANL has not been delegated any AHJ responsibilities associated with 
the approval of the content, format, breadth or inclusion of strategies with LAFD pre-
incident plans through the Cooperative Agreement or associated document.”74 This 
report criticizes the LAFD pre-incident plan for LANL Technical Area 53, citing 
insufficient information related to hazards, contamination potential, criticality, and other 
operations within the facility.75 Like past evaluations, this report states, “To be effective, 
these pre-incident plan elements require extensive facility review and support from 
nuclear facility management.”76  
Consistent with other evaluations, this report cited insufficient information and 
called for input from LANL facility subject-matter experts. LAFD staff cannot improve 
their pre-incident plans alone; LAFD members gathering data at LANL facilities do not 
have the necessary expertise or access to information to update the plans, and must 
depend on LANL staff to provide the information.  
J. 2016: LOS ALAMOS SITE OFFICE 
The most recent recorded evaluation was in a letter sent from the Los Alamos 
DOE/NNSA site office to LAFD on November 21, 2016.77 This letter was sent from Site 
Office Manager Kimberly Davis Lebak and addressed to LAFD Fire Chief Troy Hughes 
and LANL Deputy Director Richard Kacich. The letter cited four different reviews of 
LAFD pre-incident plans, indicating, “Numerous concerns have been identified about the 
content and validity of these documents.”78 Lebak noted that the site office had reviewed 
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LAFD pre-incident plans in August, and found “several disconnects” between the 
planning process and NFPA 1620 requirements, including deficiencies in NFPA 1620 or 
similar tactical criteria.79 Of the thirty-seven criteria evaluated, nineteen met expectations 
and eighteen failed to meet expectations.  
The letter stated that the Los Alamos site office recognizes some improvement in 
the LAFD pre-incident planning process, yet “the results of the review indicate that 
significant facility information and pre-planned strategies remain unavailable to 
responding firefighters.”80 Lebak specifically requested LAFD undertake the following 
actions: 
• Assemble a knowledgeable team (to potentially include external support 
with NFPA 1620 expertise) to evaluate and reinvigorate the LANL pre-
incident plan approach and process. 
• Strive for more timely and comprehensive pre-incident plan reviews and 
updates for LANL hazardous materials and complex facilities. 
• Receive close support from Los Alamos National Security, LLC.81 
Lebak stressed that the positive outcomes from this effort could include:  
• advanced effectiveness of LAFD response effort, 
• a better chance of saving lives and preserving critical government 
property, and 
• the ability to protect the safety and health of responding firefighters.82 
Lebak’s remarks are consistent with other evaluations. Her request to assemble a 
“knowledgeable team” to work toward improving the pre-incident planning process 
aligns with previously recommended improvement measures.  
                                                 
79 Standard criteria came from both NFPA 1620 and a textbook titled “Structural Firefighting: 
Strategy and Tactics. Lebak, 2; NFPA, NFPA 1620; Bernard Klaene, Structural Firefighting Strategy and 
Tactics, 3rd ed. (Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett Learning, 2016). 
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K. 2013 AND 2016: INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE  
The Insurance Services Office (ISO) conducts a Public Protection Classification 
survey that evaluates fire department operations. Based on the survey data, fire 
departments are ranked between 1 and 10, with 1 being the highest ranking.83 LAFD has 
consistently been ranked a 2, which is the second highest ranking. To determine their 
rank, fire departments receive ranking scores in several categories; within the “credit for 
training” category is a subcategory called “pre-fire planning process.” LAFD received 
14.10 of 15 points in this subcategory during the 2013 ISO evaluation, and 8.04 of 12 
possible points in 2016.84 The evaluations only show the point totals, and do not explain 
how the points are calculated. The ISO report offers the following explanation: 
For maximum credit, pre-fire planning inspections of each commercial, 
industrial, institutional, and other similar type building (all buildings 
except 1–4 family dwellings) should be made annually by company 
members. Records of inspections should include up-to-day notes and 
sketches.85  
By reviewing the ISO evaluations, it is difficult for LAFD to determine specific 
improvements to make. Additionally, because the scoring matrix for pre-incident 
planning changed between the 2013 and 2016 evaluations without a specific 
understanding of how the points were achieved, LAFD cannot directly discern or address 
its shortcoming. What is clear from both evaluations is that LAFD has room to improve 
in future evaluations. 
L. CONCLUSION 
One common criticism of the LAFD pre-incident planning documents between 
1995 and 2016 is a general lack of site-specific information. The 2009 and 2014 baseline 
needs assessments provide specific lists of needed information; in both documents, the 
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lists are identical, indicating that recommendations from the 2009 report were never 
implemented. While most recommendations were general, two of the recommendations 
mentioned a specific location or pre-incident plan.86  
On December 9, 2016, the LAFD database contained 1,365 pre-incident plans, 
each developed independently of one another. However, the documents are all developed 
in accordance with an LAFD fire chief directive called Pre-Incident Plan (PIP) Program, 
division 300, article 1.87 The directive was first written in 1991 and was updated in 1995, 
2006, twice in 2010, and again in October 2014. The updates appear to correlate with the 
outside evaluations.  
Both DOE Inspectors General Friedman and Farris mentioned the authority 
having jurisdiction (AHJ) in their reports. Friedman contended that the head of the 
DOE/NNSA Los Alamos site office should be considered the AHJ.88 Farris noted that the 
AHJ has not approved the LAFD pre-incident planning process, but also submits that 
LANL has not been delegated any AHJ responsibilities.89 The AHJ designation is 
important because of recommendations in NFPA 1620, which gives the AHJ the 
following responsibilities: 
• 1.31 The authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) shall determine the locations 
(s) to be pre-incident planned, data to be collected, and extent of 
documentation and training appropriate for the jurisdiction.  
• 1.3.2 The authority having jurisdiction shall apply the requirements in this 
standard to the development of a pre-incident plan.90  
• 4.3.1* The level of detail of the data collected shall be determined by the 
authority having jurisdiction for the pre-incident plan development. 
• 4.4* Pre-Incident Plan Preparation. The authority having jurisdiction shall 
determine the complexity of the pre-incident plan to maintain ease of use.  
                                                 
86 Farris, “Revision 1 Baseline Needs Assessment.” 
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• 4.41 The AHJ shall consider if it is necessary to modify operational 
procedures to reflect unique site conditions found during pre-planning data 
collection and include those procedures in the pre-incident plan.  
• 4.5.1 The AHJ shall decide how to present the details of the plan in the 
most concise format for the user.  
• 4.7 Pre-Incident Plan Distribution. Copies of the pre-incident plan shall be 
distributed to responsible personnel as determine by the AHJ.91  
NFPA 1620 discusses selection of the appropriate AHJ regarding the pre-incident 
planning process:  
A.1.3.3 The specific determination of the authority having jurisdiction 
depends on the mechanism under which this standard is adopted and 
enforced. Where the standard is adopted voluntarily by a particular 
emergency services organization (ESO) for its own use, the ESO is the 
authority having jurisdiction. Where the standard is legally adopted and 
enforced by a body having regulatory authority over an ESO, such as the 
federal, state, or local government or political subdivision, the body is 
responsible for making those determinations as the authority having 
jurisdiction. The pre-incident plan development should take into account 
the ESO services, the financial resources available, the availability of 
personnel, the availability of trainers, and such other factors as will affect 
the ESO’s ability to achieve compliance.92  
LAFD provides services to LANL through a cooperative agreement with 
DOE/NNSA. A cooperative agreement can be defined as  
a form of assistance. It reflects a relationship between the U.S. 
Government and a recipient. Cooperative agreements are used when the 
government’s purpose is to assist the intermediary in providing goods or 
services to the authorized recipient, rather than to acquire an 
intermediary’s services, which may ultimately be delivered to an 
authorized recipient. [Trauma Serv. Group v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 
426 (Fed. Cl. 1995).]93  
It does not appear that a cooperative agreement provides any regulatory authority.  
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Several of the LAFD pre-incident plan reviews call for increased support from 
facility staff. The LANL complex comprises 1,000 buildings (including thirteen nuclear 
facilities), approximately 8.2 million square feet of covered space, and chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive hazards.94 The complex challenges LAFD 
faces at LANL go beyond typical fire department experiences. Support from LANL 
facility personnel who deeply understand these hazards is essential to the successful 
development of pre-incident plans.  
Several evaluation authors identified deficiencies in specific operational strategies 
or pre-defining apparatus staging areas with LAFD pre-incident plans. NFPA 1620 
specifically addresses this issue: 
A.4.3.1.2 For this effort, it is critical that the pre-incident plan developer 
and user (s) interact. An overabundance of information can be a 
detrimental to a pre-incident plan user as a lack of information if the user 
cannot easily distinguish critical information. Additionally, the specifics of 
any particular incident cannot be exhaustively anticipated. Therefore, the 
pre-incident plan should not attempt to perform incident command or 
management functions (e.g., placing apparatus, specifying attack 
strategies), although this could be desirable in certain instances.95  
The evaluators’ suggestion for more comprehensive information conflicts with NFPA 
1620, section A.4.6, which stresses the critical nature of information being “relevant, 
clear, concise, and complete.”96 This section goes on to say, “It is unlikely that 
emergency responders will have the time to read extensive text. Information should be 
presented graphically (sketches and pictures) wherever possible.”97 This suggestion 
appears to agree with a study Klein et al.’s 1985 study.98  
Almost every evaluation—in addition to NFPA 1620—stressed the need for 
cooperation between responders and facility representatives. NFPA 1620 suggests that 
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pre-incident plans should address how responders can consult with site representatives 
“until an on-site liaison can be established.”99 With a large number of LANL facilities 
and their extraordinary scope of work, LAFD requires a great deal of assistance from 
facility subject-matter experts to create comprehensive and complete pre-incident plans.  
The most common deficiency found in LAFD pre-incident plans was incomplete 
or insufficient information, which is directly correlated to poor collaboration between 
LAFD and LANL facility subject-matter experts. The call for more involvement from 
LANL staff appears to have fallen on deaf ears. Many years have passed without any 
significant increase in collaboration. Although these critical evaluations are widely 
distributed to LAFD and LANL, they do not appear to affect how planning documents 
are developed or maintained. It certainly appears that a more influential method, possibly 
resembling the mandate in the UK, might be necessary to effect substantial change in the 
pre-incident planning process.  
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IV. LAFD PRE-INCIDENT PLANNING 2017 
This chapter describes the LAFD pre-incident planning process to facilitate its 
comparison to literature review findings and best practices. This description of the LAFD 
program also validates the findings from pre-incident plan evaluations discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
A. OVERSIGHT AND STAFFING 
The LAFD LANL Training Division chief oversees pre-incident plan 
development and maintenance. The chief is supported by one technical specialist. Both 
the chief and specialist have heavy workloads outside of their pre-incident planning 
duties.  
B. FIRE CHIEF’S DIRECTIVE 
The LAFD Fire Chief’s Directive (FCD) provides formal guidance for pre-
incident planning.100 This FCD was first written in March 1995 and has been revised four 
times since; the most recent revision was released on October 21, 2014. The only outside 
source the FCD cites is the 2010 version of NFPA 1620.101 The research in this chapter 
stems predominantly from the FCD, as well as from interviews the author conducted with 
the LANL training chief and technical specialists who support LAFD’s pre-incident 
planning program. The FCD categorizes LANL facilities into four classes: high, 
important, moderate, and low. The directive requires yearly site visits for “high” facilities 
and some “important” facilities; site visits for “important” and some “moderate” facilities 
must occur every two years, and every three years for “moderate” and “low” facilities.102 
The directive further requires that assignments are sent by January 31 and completed and 
submitted to the LAFD LANL training coordinator by December 31 of the same year.  
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After every major incident, the directive calls for LAFD to review the facility’s 
pre-incident plan. While post-incident reviews do occur, the post-incident plans are 
frequently not analyzed as part of the review process.103  
The directive also calls for pre-incident plan training and validation. The LAFD 
training division is responsible for developing exercises to test pre-incident plans’ 
effectiveness. LAFD Training Division Chief Gill conducted a review of LAFD training 
records contained within the FIREHOUSE records management system and found no 
training records that specifically mentioned pre-incident planning training had occurred 
in the last year.104 
LAFD LANL Training Division Chief Grano provided training to all LAFD 
captains in March 2017. During the training, Chief Grano showed responders how to 
enter pre-incident plan updates into the FIREHOUSE records management system. 
However, this training did not show up in a record search; this is likely because the 
training rosters were not completed or entered into the records management system.  
C. TECHNOLOGY 
LAFD currently uses a pre-incident planning program that is part of a 
FIREHOUSE records management software package.105 Though it can be altered to 
some degree, the FIREHOUSE Mobile Preplans software presents a standard format—
compliant with NFPA 1620—that is utilized by many fire departments nationwide. The 
associated pre-plans are contained in a Panasonic Toughbook laptop mounted inside all 
front-line fire response apparatus, including the shift battalion chief’s unit. This laptop 
serves only as an electronic look-up device for pre-plans and does not serve as a mobile 
dispatch terminal. LAFD units do not currently contain mobile dispatch terminals, but the 
department plans to purchase and install terminals in all response apparatus, with funding 
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from a federal grant, prior to July 1, 2018. The Toughbook laptops are not connected to 
the internet, unless the trucks are parked in the station and the laptop is connected to the 
wireless network, or if the laptop is plugged directly into the Los Alamos County 
network via a hard cable. Pre-plans can only be updated when the laptop is connected to 
the internet, the FIREHOUSE software is running, and the update command is selected. 
This update, or synchronization, is generally done by the driver of each LAFD apparatus 
at the start of his or her forty-eight-hour tour of duty during the first morning truck check.  
On August 31, 2017, the author conducted unannounced observations of the 
LAFD Panasonic Toughbooks that contain LAFD pre-incident plans. The observations 
were designed to determine the effectiveness of the hardware and software associated 
with LAFD pre-incident planning. The LAFD member operating the device was logged 
on before the observation began. The observation was timed, starting when each 
Toughbook was turned on and displayed the home screen. The LAFD operators were 
asked to access the pre-incident plan for LANL Technical Area 48, Building 29. 
Observations were conducted throughout the day at all five LAFD fire stations.  
LAFD pre-plan Toughbooks are located on Engine 1, Truck 1, and Battalion 1 
within LAFD Fire Station 1. The Toughbook on Battalion 1 successfully recalled the 
specified pre-incident plan in approximately 1 minute and 15 seconds. The Toughbooks 
on both Truck 1 and Engine 1 could not successfully retrieve the pre-incident plan after 
eight minutes. LAFD Fire Station 3 contained two pre-plan Toughbooks, one on Truck 3 
and one on Engine 3. The unit on Truck 3 was out of service and not available to test. 
The unit on Engine 3 was able to access the specified pre-plan in 1 minute and 
45 seconds. Station 4 contained one Toughbook, on Engine 40. This unit was not able to 
access the pre-plan; it went into a synchronizing mode and then failed completely or 
locked up six minutes into the test. The inoperable unit was taken out of service and sent 
for repair. Station 5 contained one Toughbook, on Engine 5. This unit failed to access the 
pre-plan and went into synchronizing mode; the test was stopped after eight minutes. The 
one Toughbook in Station 6, on Engine 6, failed to connect and went into synchronizing 
mode; the test was again stopped after eight minutes. Of the ten unit observations two 
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units passed, five units failed, and one unit was out of service; only 25 percent of the 
LAFD pre-plan Toughbooks could access LAFD pre-plans.  
D. NEW FACILITY PRE-INCIDENT PLAN DEVELOPMENT 
When a new facility is constructed, the LAFD LANL Training Division chief 
directly oversees the initial pre-plan development. This chief may use field crews to 
gather information about the site, but will be directly involved in inputting critical 
information and finalizing the plan before it is published and available in the 
FIREHOUSE software database. Once the chief has a draft plan, he or she sends the draft 
to the LANL Fire Protection Division, where a subject-matter expert reviews the 
document and sends comments back to LANL Fire Protection staff; the Fire Protection 
staff adds these comments to any existing comments on the document. Once all 
comments are incorporated, the LANL Fire Protection Division sends their comments 
back to the LAFD LANL Training Division chief, who incorporates them into the draft 
plan; the chief may ask for clarification if comments are unclear or conflicting. The chief 
then finalizes the document and publishes it in FIREHOUSE, where it is available to 
responders. A copy of the finalized plan is also sent to the LANL Fire Protection Division 
and the DOE/NNSA field office. 
E. UPDATING AND MAINTAINING EXISTING PRE-INCIDENT PLANS 
The division chief periodically assigns filed crews to update LAFD pre-incident 
plans. Crews are spread out over three shifts that work in five different locations. Two of 
these locations have two captains in the station. The pre-incident planning update 
assignments are given to twenty-one LAFD captains each year. Each captain is typically 
given twenty-five to thirty plans to update. Although the FCD requires pre-incident plan 
update assignments to be issued by January 31, assignments typically do not go out until 
later in the year, but generally by May. Updates must be completed by December 31, and 
captains are responsible for developing their own schedules to facilitate completion. 
While some captains complete all their updates on time, others do not. If an update is not 
completed, it is reassigned to the same captain the following year, in addition to the 
captain’s new assignments; if a captain has been lax with assignment completion, his or 
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her number of update assignments could double. To collect information for pre-incident 
plan updates, the crew uses a paper template on a clipboard, which they bring back to the 
fire station. The captain then uses a LAC computer terminal to enter the updates in the 
FIREHOUSE database system. As mentioned, timely completion of updates is sporadic; 
Table 1 shows the number of plans assigned each year between 2010 and 2017 against 
the number completed within the allotted timeframe. 
Table 1.   Pre-incident Plan Update Completion Rates, 2010–2017106 
Year Plan Updates Assigned Updates Completed % Completed  
2010 338 276 82% 
2011 446 375 84% 
2012 388 314 81% 
2013 357 271 76% 
2014 663 340 51% 
2015 514 367 71% 
2016 564 504 89% 
2017 (5 months) 563 370 66% 
 
As of June 2017, some captains had updated 100 percent of their plans, and others 
had not completed any updates. A captain at LAFD Station 6 was assigned sixty plan 
updates and had only completed six (10 percent), although this was the largest number of 
assignments among LAFD captains. The large number of assignments indicates that this 
particular captain did not complete his assigned updates the previous year and they were 
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F. PRE-INCIDENT PLAN DATA 
Even when Toughbooks can successfully open the FIREHOUSE Mobile Preplan 
software, the product has limited usefulness.107 The software does not contain mapping 
assistance to help guide the LAFD response unit to the incident location. As an example, 
this section discusses the pre-incident plan for LANL Technical Area 53, Building 945.  
The written section of this plan contains limited information. Although the plan 
does indicate locations of hazards and the alarm panel, it does not contain a map or floor 
plan, which means the responder must make an educated guess based only on the written 
descriptions. Although the plan describes the facility as a single-story building, it later 
indicates a specific hazard in the basement. The firefighting strategy for a true one-story 
building can be drastically different than the plan for a building with a basement.  
The LAFD pre-incident plan and attached LANL building run sheet both contain 
facility contacts. LAFD has recently worked with LANL to transfer updated contact 
information electronically each month. This same contact list is updated daily at the 24/7 
LANL operations center. Although having the contact list in the pre-incident plan might 
be convenient, it is not necessary; up-to-date contact information is readily available 
through a telephone call to the LANL operations center.  
The plan for Technical Area 53, Building 945 contains four attachments, but they 
are not labeled; this means the operator must open each attached file to determine the 
information it contains. The attachments contain a copy of a building run sheet used by 
LANL emergency management staff, a list of smoke/heat detector numbers and locations 
in the building, one aerial “Google Earth”-style view of the building, and four pages from 
a LANL map book. The aerial view and other maps in the electronic file were incorrectly 
included for LANL Technical Area 48 rather than Area 53.  
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G. COLLABORATION WITH LANL STAFF 
As of May 19, 2017, LAFD had submitted fifty-two pre-incident plan updates to 
the LANL Fire Protection Division for subject-matter expert review. The LANL Fire 
Protection Division sends the LAFD plan updates to the facility staff and requests review 
and suggestions for improvement. LAFD received comments back for ten of the updated 
plans and incorporated all comments except one, which lacked specificity—it 
recommended more strategy, but did not specify to which strategy it referred. LAFD 
asked for clarification, but did not receive a response. Less than 20 percent of the 
submitted plan updates received additional recommendations for improvement. LAFD 
responders and LANL emergency managers both use a pre plan–type document to guide 
them during a response. Neither LAFD responders nor LANL emergency managers are 
included in the development of the plan documents. LANL emergency managers share 
part of their plan with LAFD (the building run sheet), but not other parts, such as the 
chemical and hazardous materials inventories.  
When a significant emergency event occurs on LANL property, both LAFD and 
LANL emergency managers respond. On Monday through Friday, from 0800–1700, both 
agencies arrive on the scene simultaneously, or within a minute or two of each other. 
Outside of these typical business hours, LANL emergency managers respond from home. 
They take a response vehicle home after hours and are given twenty minutes to arrive on 
LANL property once requested to respond to an emergency. This means that if LAFD 
responders are on scene at a serious event, they may wait for 20 minutes or more to 
obtain valuable information that is only held by LANL emergency managers.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Current LAFD pre-incident planning processes directly align with common 
findings in previous evaluations. The plans lack information, and LAFD and LANL do 
not effectively collaborate to maintain and improve the plans. There should not be 
multiple plans for responders going to the same event; LAFD and LANL emergency 
managers should be looking at a common response plan. Without immediate access to 
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critical information contained in LANL-only plans during after-hour response, LAFD 
responders can be in danger, and the effectiveness of their response may be limited.  
Technology failures that affect plan accessibility are problematic. Without reliable 
access to the plans, LAFD captains may not see the value of completing their plan 
updates on schedule. Although plan access should be improved, even the most reliable 
technology can fail. LAFD should have a backup plan for technological failures.  
The fire chief’s directive does not have up-to-date references and does not 
reference DOE orders. This guidance document needs to be updated and should reference 
applicable DOE orders. The staff assigned to oversee LAFD pre-incident plans are busy 
supporting other mission-critical functions, and do not have the necessary time to focus 
effort on improving the planning processes. It may be more effective to specifically 
assign an individual or group a special project focused only on improving the LAFD pre-
incident planning process.  
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V. BEST PRACTICES IN PRE-INCIDENT PLANNING 
Rather than conducting a ground-up evaluation of the planning process, this thesis 
reviews other agencies that conduct pre-incident planning to identify best practices. 
Following the advice of Bardach and Patashnik, the “tangible and visible behavior” 
associated with pre-incident planning was examined in the selected “best practice” 
agencies.108 The participating agencies were selected for their similarities with LAFD. 
Fire departments from other national laboratories plan for similar hazards with DOE 
oversight. Internationally accredited fire departments have completed the same rigorous 
evaluation as LAFD and plan within a similar operational improvement atmosphere. 
From what we know thus far, being accredited does not necessarily mean a department 
will have a successful pre-incident planning program, but it does mean the department 
maintains core values of continuous evaluation and improvement. Accredited fire 
departments that have proactively improved their pre-incident planning processes have 
likely documented the improvements, and are likely to share them.  
A. NATIONAL LABORATORY FIRE DEPARTMENTS 
1. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) 
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is very similar to LANL; it is a large 
national laboratory that, like LANL, conducts national security research overseen by the 
DOE. Accordingly, the lab’s hazards are much like LANL’s, so the pre-incident planning 
process serves a similar environment. INL utilizes three guidance documents related to 
pre-incident planning: an incident planning process SOP, a pre-incident planning process 
SOP, and a “Quick Access Plans” document.  
INL’s “SOP-2.1.3 Incident Planning Process” primarily lists the duties of the 
incident planning program manager, company officers, and shift battalion chiefs.109 
“SOP-2.1.3.1 Pre-incident Planning” provides additional details on what to include in a 
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pre-incident plan, and lists specific duties of company officers, shift battalion chiefs, and 
the responsible staff officer.110 The third document, “SOP 2.1.3.2 Quick Access Plans,” 
describes how to properly complete a quick access plan, which is created for each 
building to which the INL Fire Department responds.111 The quick access plan is 
designed to clearly and concisely provide critical information; the document contains 
only one page of written information, broken down into five sections: 
• Section 1—Hazards: utilizes the NFPA 704 hazard system to identify 
criticality controlled areas and any other special or physical hazards. 
• Section 2—Facility and Building: includes a photo of the building and an 
explanation of any hazards identified in Section 1. 
• Section 3—Building Description: describes the building construction type, 
its contents hazard class, physical dimensions, and fire suppression 
systems. 
• Section 4—Utility Locations and Shut Offs  
• Section 5—briefly describes special considerations like access issues, 
exposure concerns, contents, or ventilation considerations.112  
The Quick Access Plan also includes a map for each floor and a building overview map. 
Including maps and floor plans, the documents are typically only two to six pages long. 
They are stored on electronic devices and are also available as paper copies.  
INL classifies a “significant facility” as “a nuclear facility, a high hazard 
occupancy, an occupancy with a replacement value in excess of $10 million, or an 
occupancy presenting unique firefighting challenges as determined by the INL Fire 
Chief.”113 Buildings classified as significant facilities require a detailed pre-incident plan 
in addition to the quick access plan. The INL detailed pre-incident plan contains eighteen 
specific information sections: 
 
                                                 
110 INL, “SOP-2.1.3.1 Pre-incident Planning” (standard operating procedure, INL, 2017). 
111 INL, “SOP 2.1.3.2 Quick Access Plans” (standard operating procedure, INL, 2017). 
112 INL, 2–3. 
113 INL, “SOP 2.1.3 Incident Planning Process,” 1. 
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1. Address 
2. Building Description 
3. Occupancy Hazard Category 
4. Building Construction 
5. Fire Suppression Systems 
6. Fire Detection Systems 
7. Water Supply 
8. Unique Building Processes 





14. Special Considerations 
15. Fire Attack 
16. Hazardous Materials 
17. Confined Space/High Angle 
18. Utilities114 
The detailed pre-incident plan may also contain relevant attachments, such as copies of 
an internal fire procedure plan. The pre-incident plan also includes detailed maps that 
show fire walls, room names or numbers, sprinkler zones, and alarm zones.115 
Detailed pre-incident plans for significant facilities must be reviewed annually, 
and quick access plans for support facilities must be reviewed every three years. Plans for 
INL facilities that contain a criticality controlled area must be reviewed by a criticality 
safety point of contact. If a facility contains a security area, its plan must be reviewed by 
                                                 
114 INL, “CPP 1696 Pre-incident Plan” (planning document, INL, 2016), 1–13. 
115 INL. 
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the area physical security officer before it is published. Pre-incident plans for qualifying 
new facilities must be documented prior to personnel occupancy. 
2. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is also very similar to LANL, but 
focuses its research on clean energy and security solutions.116 ORNL utilizes a detailed 
pre-incident plan and a pre-incident information sheet. The ORNL “Pre-fire Plans” SOP 
lists specific responsibilities related to pre-incident plans, criteria to determine which 
facilities require a plan, requirements for plan content, review and distribution 
requirements, and documentation handling requirements.117 This pre-plan SOP requires 
ORNL facilities to conduct pre-planning reviews annually, biennially, or triennially: 
• Annual pre-fire plans  
o Category 1 and 2 nuclear facilities 
o Facilities in excess of $100 million 
o Facilities considered high hazard by the contractor 
o Facilities considered high importance to the contractor in the 
completion of their contracted scope of work 
• Biennial pre-fire plans  
o Category 3 nuclear facilities 
o Radiological facilities 
o Facilities valued in excess of $10 million up to $100 million 
• Triennial pre-fire plans  
o Facilities with a fire protection system 
o Facilities with special hazards 
o Facilities with special or significant operational importance 
o Facilities where unique firefighting activities may be executed118 
                                                 
116 Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), “Solving the Big Problems,” accessed October 9, 2017, 
https://www.ornl.gov/content/solving-big-problems. 
117 ORNL, “LPD-FD-ADM-020104 Rev 8 Pre-fire Plans” (planning document, ORNL, 2014). 
118 ORNL, 2. 
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ORNL facilities that do not meet any of these qualifiers do not require a pre-incident 
plan. If major changes have occurred to the configuration of the building or facility 
operations, ORNL does require the pre-incident plan to be updated immediately. 
Planners generate drawings within the plans using Microsoft Visio, under the 
guidance of a specific set of drawing specifications reflected in the SOP.119 In the sample 
plan ORNL provided, drawings are very detailed and provide relevant information related 
to an emergency response. Written information within the plan is robust, listed in twenty-
two specific categories: 
1. Building number 
2. Building name 
3. Normal Occupancy 
4. Street Location 
5. Important information—not listed in another specific category 
6. Exposures 
7. Power main 
8. Gas 
9. Potable water 
10. Wall construction 
11. Roof construction 
12. Floor construction 
13. Door construction 
14. Fire alarm signal 
15. Fire protection systems at property 
16. Hydrant 1 and 2—closest and next closest hydrants 
17. Hazardous conditions/situation 
18. Tactical considerations 
                                                 
119 ORNL, 3. 
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19. Required fire flow—25 percent involvement, 50 percent involvement, and 
100 percent involvement  
20. Date of last full review 
21. Date of last update 
22. Full reviewer author120 
ORNL fire officers are responsible for updating pre-incident plans. They are 
given the update assignment at the beginning of the month and must have the update 
completed prior to their last working day of the month. During the month following any 
update, fire officers must review the updated document and potentially tour the facility; 
the company officer decides if a tour is necessary based on the crew’s familiarity with the 
facility.121 Training rosters must be completed to reflect any reviews and/or tours related 
to the updated pre-incident plan.122 ORNL responders utilize printed copies of pre-
incident plans in response units and electronic versions in their emergency operations 
center.  
ORNL also utilizes a pre-incident information sheet. The pre-incident information 
sheet is “a condensed version of a pre-fire plan for project/events/experiment that pose 
unique or special hazards.”123 The sheet is used for special projects or events that are 
temporary in nature and have a clear beginning and ending point. They could be added to 
a detailed pre-incident plan for an experiment that is occurring at a planned facility, but 
will not become part of the regular operations at the facility. 
3. Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL)  
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), though like LANL, occupies a much 
smaller geographic area (on New York’s Long Island) and conducts more diverse 
                                                 
120 ORNL, 4. 
121 ORNL, 1. 
122 “Public Safety Training Management System,” Target Solutions, accessed September 7, 2017, 
http://www.targetsolutions.com/. 
123 ORNL, “LPD-FD-ADM-020105 Rev 5 Pre-incident Plans” (planning document, ORNL, 2017), 1. 
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research. They call their pre-incident plans “run cards.”124 Run cards are required for 
buildings that have a Facility Use Agreement, or for specialty operations that could pose 
a significant hazard.125 BNL run cards comprise three parts: a main section, utilities 
section, and contacts section. The main section includes hazards, special notes, fire 
department connections, fire protection systems, fire panel locations, key box locations, 
construction type, and occupancy.126 The utilities section includes shutoff locations for 
HVAC, gas, electric, water, chilled water, and compressed air.127 The contacts section 
lists the primary local emergency coordinator, secondary local emergency coordinator, 
telephone numbers, division manager, and key personnel.128 
BNL also documents how they develop a local emergency plan.129 Local 
emergency plans are created for individual buildings and provided to the building 
occupants and fire department. This local emergency plan explains “what to do” in the 
event of an emergency, and can contain contact information, personnel accountability, 
shelter-in-place procedures, automated external defibrillator locations, and HVAC 
shutdown procedures.130 This document lets responders know how the building 
occupants were instructed to react during an emergency.  
BNL staffs local emergency coordinators to enhance response. The coordinators 
are building residents, not emergency responders, who create and maintain the local 
emergency plan for their buildings.131 They are also responsible for ensuring that 
building fire/evacuation drills are conducted, emergency equipment in the building is 
                                                 
124 While responders in many parts of the United States use “pre-incident plan” as the predominant 
terminology, some geographic areas use “run card”—much how the terms “soda” and “pop” are preferred 
in different areas of the country. 
125 Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), “Completing and Editing Emergency Pre-plan Response 
Cards” (planning document, BNL, 2013), 1. 
126 BNL, 2. 
127 BNL, 2. 
128 BNL, 2. 
129 BNL, “Developing Local Emergency Plans” (planning document, BNL, 2014). 
130 BNL, “Local Emergency Plan Template” (planning document, BNL, 2016). 
131 BNL, “Emergency Preparation—Local Emergency Coordinators” (planning document, BNL, 
2016). 
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maintained, and notification systems are in working order, as well as leading personnel 
accountability efforts during an exercise or actual emergency event.  
BNL’s pre-incident planning process does not provide specific details for building 
a pre-incident plan; rather, the facility uses a capability planning process as described by 
Roman.132 BNL involves multiple impacted groups in the process, which appears to be a 
good method for building a common operating picture during an actual emergency event.  
4. SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory  
In May 2017, a SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory representative—Assistant 
Fire Marshal Lance Lougee—delivered a presentation at the DOE Emergency 
Management Issues Special Interest Group Annual Meeting that described some aspects 
of SLAC’s pre-incident planning program.133 SLAC’s technologically advanced program 
is cloud based and provides state-of-the-art graphical guidance to emergency responders, 
showing aerial views, floor plans, interior and exterior images, and clear symbols to 
indicate essential elements like fire hydrants, sprinkler hookups, and fire alarm panel 
locations. Additionally, responders can view images from security cameras to check for 
smoke or fire inside the building that may not be visible from the exterior, which helps 
them plan resource deployment and prioritize response tasks—this also allows responders 
to determine if a fire alarm activation was a false alarm, or a true activation that requires 
immediate dispatch. The pre-incident plans also call for automatic updates of facility 
contacts and chemical or hazardous materials inventories. The pre-incident plan program 
is configured to mine for this information in the records management software, which 
means a human being does not need to retrieve or input the information into the program 
manually. Marshal Lougee, who manages the pre-incident plan program, indicated during 
his presentation that it took about five years, from concept to implementation, to develop 
the program.134  
                                                 
132 Roman, “Collaborative Radiological Response Planning.” 
133 Lougee, “Pre-incident Planning.” 
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B. INTERNATIONALLY ACCREDITED FIRE DEPARTMENTS  
Because there is no list that ranks successful fire department pre-incident planning 
programs, the author narrowed research to internationally accredited departments to 
examine “best practices” data. While none of the departments that provide pre-incident 
planning information also provide emergency response to a national laboratory, and none 
provide samples of actual pre-incident plans, they all do have standard operating 
procedures document that describe how their pre-incident planning programs operate. 
Since these departments operate in a somewhat different environment than LAFD, the 
author’s review of their programs was not as detailed as it was for fire departments that 
respond to other national laboratories. This review focuses on highlights from their 
standard operating procedures that might be applicable, or that differ from LANL and 
other national laboratory procedures.  
The Statesville, North Carolina, Fire Department classifies pre-incident plans as 
either “standard” plans or “process-level” plans.135 Process-level plans are more detailed 
than standard plans, and are developed for facilities that conduct hazardous processes. 
Statesville also identifies three hydrants in priority order, uses pre-established symbols on 
drawings, and utilizes First Look Pro software to manage its pre-incident plan 
program.136 The Cedar Park, Texas, Fire Department requires crews that are completing 
a pre-incident plan to ladder the building and look for hazards on the roof.137 Their SOP 
also provides specific guidelines for drawings of the site and facility. Both Cedar Park 
and the North Liberty, Iowa, Fire Departments use FIREHOUSE software to manage 
their programs.138 Savannah, Georgia’s, Fire & Emergency Services has a hazardous 
materials response team that supports pre-incident planning at facilities that contain 
                                                 
135 Statesville Fire Department, “1.10.6 Pre-incident Planning” (planning document, Statesville Fire 
Department, 2008). 
136 “First Look Pro,” The CAD Zone, accessed September 7, 2017, http://www.cadzone.com/first-
look-pro. 
137 City of Cedar Park Fire Department, “Pre-incident Planning Program,” (planning document, City 
of Cedar Park Fire Department, 2016), 1. 
138 North Liberty Fire Department, “Pre-incident Plans—Administrative Policy No. 016” (planning 
document, North Liberty Fire Department, 2017), 2. 
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significant hazardous materials.139 Ottawa Fire Services in Canada does not conduct code 
enforcement action during pre-planning visits to facilities, but if responders notice 
potential violations, they will forward the information to the fire marshal’s office for code 
enforcement follow-up.140  
The Bowling Green, Kentucky, Fire Department aggressively updates it pre-
incident plans; general plans are updated annually, and “special-risk” plans are updated 
biennially.141 They also pre-plan for a wide range of facilities, including: 
• all commercial occupancies, 
• all properties located within the city boundaries, or owned or leased by the 
city of Bowling Green, 
• all multi-family residential units having four or more living units, 
• all properties owned or leased by Bowling Green University, 
• any occupancy equipped with a sprinkler system and/or a standpipe 
system, and  
• any occupancy with a Knox Box.142 
Bowling Green’s pre-incident plan lists all fire hydrants within 800 feet of the facility. 
The department uses the Ohio Fire Code as a guide for uniformly determining 
construction class. The North Charleston, South Carolina, Fire Department’s standard 
operating procedure document clearly defines how pre-incident plans should be stored: 
they must be placed in alphabetical order by street name and numerical order by 
address.143 Charleston also uses NFPA Standard 220—Standard on Types of Building 
                                                 
139 Jeffrey Alberts, “OPS 58 Pre-fire Plans Savannah Fire and Emergency Services” (planning 
document, Savannah Fire & Emergency Services, 2017), 2. 
140 Ottawa Fire Services, “GO 1 FI 01.11-2011—Pre-fire Building Planning—Revised,” (planning 
document, Ottawa Fire Services, 2011), 2. 
141 Bowling Green Fire Division, “Policy 408: Pre-plan Development and Review” in Bowling Green 
Fire Division Policy Manual (Frisco, TX: Lexipol, 2017), 1. 
142 Bowling Green Fire Division, 1. 
143 North Charleston Fire Department, “SOG-200.20—Pre-incident Surveys” (planning document, 
North Charleston Fire Department, 2017), 2. 
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Construction and the International Fire Code Fire Flow Table—to uniformly determine 
building construction type and necessary fire flow.144 
The Miami-Dade, Florida, Fire Rescue Department classifies its pre-incident plan 
facilities in three different priority levels145:  
• Priority 1—Industrial occupancy structures, 
• Priority 2—High Occupancy structures, 
• Priority 3—Commercial occupancy structures. 
Like others, Miami-Dade lists specific requirements for drawings and photos within the 
plan.146 The department also provides instructions for developing plans for complex sites 
that contain multiple buildings. For these properties, the department utilizes a master plan 
and a dependent plan concept. The department’s pre-incident plan training manual 
provides additional guidance for conducting pre-incident planning at complex. Miami-
Dade, like some other reviewed departments, also assigns pre-incident plans monthly and 
accesses plans electronically on a mobile computing unit.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This review of best practices has revealed several practical solutions to 
deficiencies identified in the LAFD pre-incident planning process. One commonality, 
specific to fire departments serving national laboratories, was collaboration between the 
fire department, facility staff, and technical experts. Most of these departments utilized a 
multi-level pre-incident planning system, in which facilities that are considered more 
dangerous or valuable receive a more detailed pre-incident plan that is reviewed annually. 
Plans for facilities with fewer hazards are less detailed and reviewed less frequently. 
Other best practices include specifications for maps, incorporation of pre-incident plans 
into training and exercises, and referencing current standards and orders in pre-incident 
planning guidance documents.  
                                                 
144 North Charleston Fire Department, 3. 
145 Arthur Holmes, “Standard Operating Procedure—Pre-incent Planning Procedure Miami-Dade” 
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 54 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 55 
VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The review of best practices and deficiencies from past evaluations has identified 
some key aspects of acceptable pre-incident planning programs. While many aspects 
could be applied to any pre-incident planning program for any fire department, others are 
applicable only to fire departments that serve a national laboratory with hazards similar to 
LANL’s. This final chapter identifies each best practice or key aspect, explains why it 
should be considered a best practice, compares it to the current LAFD pre-incident 
planning processes, and discusses how it should be incorporated into LAFD’s planning 
process if needed.  
A. RELIABLE ACCESS 
(1) Discussion  
NFPA 1620 allows responders to use electronic devices to access pre-incident 
plans, but only if the devices meet certain criteria. The authority having jurisdiction must 
consider the device reliable, secure from unauthorized use, secure from unauthorized 
changes, and transportable to the incident scene.147 Oak Ridge utilizes an electronic 
device to store their pre-incident plans, but also has backup paper copies in case of a 
technological failure. In 2007, the Charleston, South Carolina, Fire Department tragically 
lost nine responders during a fire in a large furniture store. Investigators found that on-
scene fire commanders did not have access to the pre-incident plan.148  
Currently, LAFD responders do not have reliable electronic access to pre-incident 
plans on station Toughbooks. When tested, only two of the eight units could access pre-
incident plan data; responders indicated that the Toughbook failures are a common 
occurrence. When electronic access fails, LAFD responders do not have backup or paper-
copy plans.  
                                                 
147 NFPA, NFPA 1620, 9. 
148 Routley et al., “Firefighter Fatality Investigative Report,” 143. 
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(2) Recommendation 
LAFD should work with IT professionals to find a reliable electronic device for 
pre-incident plan access. Responders should also have access to a paper copy of the most 
significant plans, which should be stored according to Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s 
method: one copy on the operational battalion chief’s response unit, and a second backup 
copy in the emergency operations center.  
B. QUICK ACCESS TO CRITICAL DATA  
(1) Discussion 
As Klein et al. state, fire ground commanders must make decisions quickly; INL’s 
quick access plans facilitate quick decision making. With just one page of critical 
information, supported by facility maps and floorplans, the quick access plans allow first-
in-fire officers to quickly access the most critical information and make tactical decisions 
within one minute.149 Klein et al.’s study reported that, of the 156 critical decisions made 
by fire ground commanders, 137 of them occurred in less than two minutes.150 
The current LAFD pre-incident plans do not facilitate quick access to critical 
information. The current system failed to access any information 75 percent of the time 
when tested. LAFD’s current plans are all in one format that does not allow for the most 
critical information to be accessed quickly.  
(2) Recommendation 
LAFD should develop a quick access pre-incident plan using the INL plan as a 
template. Quick access plans for the most critical facilities should be accessible both 
electronically and as a hard copy on all response apparatus.  
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When compared to INL’s significant facility pre-incident plan program, the 
LANL program and plans lack detail. Past evaluation of the LAFD pre-incident program 
specifically note insufficient information as a significant issue. This thesis research may 
be the first existing comparison between LAFD plans and plans from other DOE sites. 
This comparison shows that LAFD pre-incident plans lack significant detail and must be 
improved, or criticism from outside evaluators will continue. Although too much 
information in a pre-incident plan can make it difficult for responders to find the most 
important details, the INL process of coupling a detailed plan with a quick access plan 
can assuage this concern. The quick access plan provides the most important details to 
facilitate initial response actions, and the detailed plan allows responders to look more 
deeply at the facility for potential long-term problems. The INL pre-incident plan 
template requires eighteen specific areas of data and the ORNL pre-incident plan calls for 
twenty-two specific data entries. The LAFD fire chief’s directive (FCD) lists thirty 
different suggested data inputs for the pre-incident plan, but the FIREHOUSE software 
used to capture and store plan data does not align with the FCD.151 The software was not 
developed specifically for fire departments that respond to national laboratories.  
(2) Recommendation 
LAFD should use pre-incident plans from INL and ORNL as models to develop a 
specific set of data categories for the detailed pre-incident plan. LAFD should also use 
software that allows data collection fields to be customized so that the FCD and data 
collection categories align. 
  
                                                 
151 LAFD, “301 Pre-incident Plan Program,” 6–7. 
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D. STANDARDS AND ORDERS, AND ENFORCEABLE POLICIES 
(1) Discussion 
The current LAFD pre-incident planning FCD does not reference the current 
NFPA 1620 standard or any associated DOE standards or orders, which likely 
contributed to past evaluations that showed a failure to evaluate the plans for criticality 
issues in moderator-controlled areas. The LAFD FCD does not give clear specifications 
regarding maps, floor plans, symbols, or other supporting graphical data. NFPA 1620 
requires the use of standardized symbols from NFPA 170.152 This requirement should be 
incorporated into the LAFD FCD.  
LAFD members are not capable of generating many supporting visual graphics, 
such as LANL maps and floor plans, and requesting this data from LANL staff has been a 
challenge. LANL support has been inconsistent. Without direct support from LANL, 
maps, floor plans, and other significant operational hazard data will continue to be absent 
from LAFD pre-incident plans.  
The LAFD pre-incident plan program is guided by the FCD, but LANL staff, who 
must actively contribute, have no guiding document related to pre-incident plans. LANL 
must establish a guidance document to ensure that staff understand how they must 
contribute to a successful pre-incident plans, and the FCD should be updated in 
conjunction with this LANL guidance. Only an enforceable LANL policy that requires 
LANL facilities staff to develop and supply specific supporting information will ensure 
critical data is included in LAFD pre-incident plans.  
(2) Recommendation 
LAFD should update its pre-incident planning to include the current editions of 
NFPA standards and DOE orders. LANL should develop a policy in coordination with 
LAFD’s pre-incident planning FCD that requires LANL facility staff to develop and 
deliver critical data for use in LAFD pre-incident plans.  
                                                 




The most notable finding from this research related to pre-incident planning is 
how that planning is conducted. LAFD pre-incident plans are developed almost entirely 
by LAFD. LANL staff infrequently respond to requests for adequate contributing 
information. The quality of pre-incident planning information cannot drastically improve 
without LANL’s increased involvement in the planning process.  
When an emergency response is needed at a LANL facility, LAFD emergency 
responders, LANL emergency management staff, and LANL facility staff from the 
affected facility are involved. One unique challenge to LAFD is that—unlike BNL, 
ORNL, and INL fire departments—LAFD is not directly associated with the prime 
contractors that operate the national laboratory. LAFD is a county agency, whereas these 
other national laboratory fire departments are departments or divisions within the 
laboratory contractor’s structure. Requests for pre-incident plan information, such as 
chemical inventories or maps, are therefore made within the same organization, which 
likely improves responsiveness.  
Pre-incident plans for LANL facilities are currently held within LAFD and are 
owned by LAFD. If these pre-incident plans were owned by LANL, there would be 
added emphasis for LANL staff to provide needed data. The process of developing and 
maintaining pre-incident plans for responses to LANL will need to apply concepts from 
the capabilities-based planning model. For instance, LANL and LAFD should form a 
working group consisting of members from both staffs, with some oversight from the 
DOE field office. LANL representatives should include members from emergency 
management, fire protection, facilities, security, and IT. The initial objective for this 
group should be to develop a LANL procedure document related to pre-incident plans at 
LANL facilities. Once formally adopted, this document would guide LANL and LAFD 
staff in the formation and maintenance of LANL pre-incident plans. It would also serve 
as a mandate for LANL staff to actively participate in the planning process and ensure 
that maps, floor plans, and other currently missing information is included in future plans 
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for LANL facilities. Los Alamos DOE/NNSA field office Manager Kim Davis-Lebak 
specifically called for the assembly of a “knowledgeable team” and “close support” from 
the contractor that operates LANL to improve LAFD pre-incident plans.153  
In 2009, INL assembled a similar working group that generated a pre-incident 
planning benchmarking report.154 This report was utilized to improve the pre-incident 
planning process at INL and is referenced in the current INL Fire Department pre-
incident planning standard operating procedure.155 BNL’s pre-incident planning process 
includes active involvement from the planned facility. BNL creates a pre-incident plan 
for emergency responders and is directly involved in the development of the facility 
emergency response plan. BNL’s plans appear to be following the capabilities-based 
planning model described by Roman.156  
The United Kingdom’s multiple-level plans correlate to the capabilities-based 
planning model. The UK planning process involves many parties and directly ties 
training and exercises to the plan to test its effectiveness. This thesis has shown several 
examples of effective emergency planning that can be used to model an improved 
emergency planning process for LANL and LAFD. Although it is possible to change the 
LANL pre-incident planning process, Roman noted that “long-term culture, system, and 
habits” can make change difficult.157 However, enhanced coordination and information 
sharing, according to Roman, can help overcome obstacles to change. Problems with 
LAFD’s pre-incident planning process date back to at least 1995; this long-standing 
problem can only be overcome with strong collaboration between LAFD and LANL.  
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(2) Recommendation 
The LAFD pre-incident plan improvement effort should follow the capabilities-
based planning model and first establish a working group to improve collaboration. The 
working group should have a clear vision for improving the planning process, and should 
use recommendations from this thesis—specifically the pre-incident planning process 
from INL—to guide improvement for all LANL pre-incident plans. The quick access 
plans and detailed pre-incident plans from INL have proven to be an industry best 
practice and should be used as a benchmark for the working group. The working group 
should use the findings from this thesis as a starting point, but should conduct site visits 
to INL and SLAC for more details about their successful pre-incident plan programs.  
F. MULTI-LEVEL PRE-INCIDENT PLANNING  
(1) Discussion 
The sheer number of LAFD pre-incident plans (more than 1,300) presents a 
logistical challenge for regular updating. The LAFD pre-incident planning FCD 
establishes four categories of planned facilities (high priority, important, moderate, low), 
but does not indicate which LANL facilities should receive a pre-incident plan.158 More 
importantly, the directive does not eliminate any LANL buildings from receiving a pre-
incident plan.  
INL’s process, however, identifies two categories of facilities related to pre-
incident plans: the significant facilities receive a detailed plan and a quick access plan, 
while support facilities receive only a quick access plan. The significant designation 
requires annual updates and the support designation requires updates once every three 
years. ORNL also clearly specifies pre-incident planning facilities that must have plans, 
and the frequency with which those plans must be updated. Within each facility category 
is specific facility requirements; any facility that does not meet a requirement within one 
of the listed categories does not receive a pre-incident plan. LAFD currently creates a 
pre-incident plan for nearly all buildings on LANL property. Some of these buildings 
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contain less than 1,000 square feet and contain no hazards. They are essentially storage 
sheds, similar to those in residential backyards, but without flammable liquids or other 
chemical hazards that might be in a typical residential storage shed.  
The concept of one master and several dependent pre-incident plans, as utilized 
by Miami-Dade Fire Rescue, may be worth considering for LANL facilities. With this 
type of plan structure, the high-hazard main buildings at LANL could facilitate master 
plans, and the smaller support buildings would have dependent plans.  
(2) Recommendation 
LAFD should establish a clear set of guidelines for categorizing pre-planned 
facilities. These guidelines should indicate a clear qualifying specification for a high-
hazard facility that requires a detailed plan (updated yearly), and a qualifying 
specification for facilities that should receive only a quick access (updated once every 
three years). The minimum requirements for completing a pre-incident plan should be 
clear so that minor or low-hazard facilities are not planned.  
G. TECHNOLOGY 
(1) Discussion 
The current LAFD process of collecting information for pre-incident plans is 
problematic. LAFD members use a paper form to collect information when updating or 
authorizing a new plan; other national laboratory sites, however, integrate technology 
into this process. SLAC employs a digital stitching camera—often used by real estate 
agents to display the interior of property for sale—to capture interior views of planned 
facilities.159 This camera produces a set of images that gives viewers a virtual reality–
type experience in which they feel as if they are walking around inside the structure. This 
would be helpful for LAFD responders, who are not likely to be extremely familiar with 
LANL buildings’ interior layouts. SLAC also includes digital images in pre-incident 
plans to display important features of the building like sprinkler hookups and utility shut-
offs. Further, SLAC’s ability to display security camera footage to incoming responders 
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helps them quickly determine the extent of the emergency. The latest technology 
available to enhance LAFD pre-incident plans should be incorporated into the program.  
LANL security is careful not to allow controlled articles within restricted 
facilities. LANL Procedure P217 lists the following items as examples of controlled 
articles: 
• cameras,  
• cell phones and smart phones (including iPhones), 
• personal digital assistants (PDAs), 
• digital audio players, 
• laptop computers, 
• Tablet computers (such as iPads, Android tablets, and Windows Surface 
devises), 
• video and audio recording equipment, 
• medical devices and ankle monitor bracelets, 
• copiers and/or scanners with a hard drive, 
• portable scanners, 
• two-way pagers,  
• two-way radios, 
• CD and DVD write drives, 
• external hard drives, 
• flash memory, and 
• USB memory devices (e.g., thumb drives, memory sticks, jump drives).160 
LAFD has had a few issues with carrying two-way radios (owned by Los Alamos 
County) into security areas, but these radios are generally accepted. LANL Procedure 
P217 section 3.3.4 has an exemption that allows LAFD responders to utilize a controlled 
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article, like a digital camera or tablet computer.161 This section gives firefighters an 
exemption to the restriction of controlled articles “while carrying out their official duties, 
unless a safety reason exists to prohibit controlled articles (e.g., cellular telephones, 
transceiver radios, and other electronic radiating/emitting devices).”162 In April 2015, the 
Los Alamos field office sent a letter to LAFD that specifically noted the controlled article 
exemption for LAFD firefighters.163 The letter goes on to say that “the NA-LA Officially 
Designated Federal Security Authority (ODFSA) and Cyber Security Authorizing 
Official support the following position of LANL P217.”164 The letter indicates that the 
firefighter exemption is valid “during emergencies and exercises/drills.” 
To collect pre-incident plan data electronically, LAFD would need to utilize 
LAFD-owned electronic devices. While the LANL P217 rule allows this, it might be 
difficult for site-area security personnel to accept the use of LAFD-owned electronic 
devices due to their focus on security and their unfamiliarity with the P217 exception. 
However, if LAFD staff use LANL-issued devices to collect data, local facility security 
would be more likely to accept the use of the electronic devices. According to P217, a 
LANL-issued device must meet five requirements it must be: 
1. purchased through the Laboratory procurement or Electronic Software 
Distribution (ESD), 
2. marked as Laboratory property, 
3. approved by the Laboratory information system security manager after 
concurrence from the Network and Infrastructure Engineering (NIE) 
Division that the device can be managed, if it is to be connected to any 
Laboratory network, 
4. configured to ensure that microphone, camera, voice record, and wireless 
capabilities are disabled in Laboratory work areas unless authorized by 
Form 1897PA, Photographic Equipment and Activity Authorization, or 
other prior approvals, and 
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5. configured to Laboratory Information Architecture and Configuration 
Management standards165 
Because facility staff are more familiar with LANL-issued electronic devices, it would be 
easier for LAFD to utilize these devices during data collection rather than relying on Los 
Alamos County’s devices.  
(2) Recommendation 
LAFD should incorporate proven technology into the pre-incident planning 
process. Site visits to INL and SLAC should be conducted to observe firsthand the 
application of modern technology into successful pre-incident planning processes.  
H. STANDARDS FOR MAPS, DRAWINGS, AND SYMBOLS  
(1) Discussion 
The sample pre-incident plans provided by INL and ORNL are starkly different 
from LAFD plans. The aerial view maps, floor plans, and sprinkler zone maps in INL and 
ORNL plans are far superior to those within, or missing from, the reviewed LAFD plan 
for LANL Technical Area 53 (in which the attached maps were for LANL Technical 
Area 48). Further, the reviewed LAFD pre-incident plans did not contain maps that 
showed aerial views of the building, sprinkler zones, or exterior connections for fire 
protection systems. INL and ORNL have specifications within their pre-incident planning 
program guidance that clarify the type of maps, floor plans, and other supporting 
graphical images that must be provided.  
The LAFD pre-incident planning FCD does not specify the types of drawings that 
need to be included in the plan. When asked how maps are attained for include in the 
plan, the chief who oversees the program and LAFD captains who collect data indicated 
that not all LAFD pre-incident plans have maps, floor plans, or aerial views of the 
building. LAFD captains indicated they sometimes make a copy of the planned facility’s 
evacuation map, and have been denied requests to obtain maps or floor plans from LANL 
facility staff, who claim the data is restricted from release outside of the facility. Without 
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a LANL policy requiring staff to provide graphical support for pre-incident plans, LAFD 
staff will remain unable to attain critical supporting graphical data.  
(2) Recommendation 
LAFD will need to update its pre-incident planning procedures to include 
specifications related to maps, floor plans, and other supporting graphical images. The 
provision of floor plans, maps, and other related data should be specific and consistent, 
and provision of the data should be mandatory. 
I. SECURITY OF INFORMATION  
(1) Discussion 
Some information in LAFD pre-incident plans is considered unclassified 
controlled unclear information (UCNI).166 Printed UCNI documents must be protected 
by the authorized user, who maintains physical control of or access to the documents. If 
LAFD pre-incident plans were printed and contained UCNI or other official use only 
(OUO) information, then these documents would need to be locked in a secure location 
on the LAFD apparatus; LAFD apparatus do not currently contain provisions to secure 
sensitive documents.  
Electronically stored UCNI and OUO documents must also be protected from 
unauthorized access. Currently, LAFD pre-incident planning documents are stored on a 
Los Alamos County electronic device that cannot store sensitive data. Storing UCNI or 
OUO documents on a LANL-issued electronic device, however, would comply with 
UCNI security requirements.167  
(2) Recommendation 
LAFD should utilize LANL-issued electronic devices to collect and store 
sensitive data. These devices are more easily accepted by security forces and have been 
designed to protect sensitive information. To ensure a secondary source is available for 
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pre-incident planning information, LAFD should install an approved locking container to 
safely store pre-incident plans that contain sensitive information.  
J. TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND AFTER-ACTION REPORTS  
(1) Discussion 
Klein et al.’s findings show that there is value in exposure to facility data. They 
found that exposure helps the fire ground command build familiarity with the potential 
response problems. Having fire ground commanders collect pre-incident plan information 
reinforces Klein et al.’s concept of prototype building to enhance familiarity with the 
planned facility.168 ORNL’s requirement that updated pre-incident plans be reviewed by 
fire department staff following any updates also supports Klein et al.’s prototype 
development.  
The United Kingdom requires responders to utilize pre-incident plans when 
developing training and exercises.169 The United Kingdom also requires pre-incident 
plans to be updated when lessons are learned from actual emergency response events.170 
To comply with this requirement, responders must review the pre-incident plan during an 
after-action review following an emergency event.  
The current LAFD FCD requires the use of pre-incident plans in training and 
exercises, but it does not appear this requirement is being implemented. Miami-Dade Fire 
Rescue, on the other hand, has a pre-incident planning process training manual.  
(2) Recommendation 
The end users of LAFD pre-incident plans will need to be involved in the 
collection of plan data and should review pre-incident plans on a regular basis to ensure 
the pre-incident planning program is enhancing facility familiarity. Training on pre-
incident plans will need to be included in the yearly training plan and a pre-incident plan 
training manual similar, to the one used by Miami-Dade, should be developed. The 
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LAFD FCD must require pre-incident plans to be reviewed in conjunction with the after-
action process. Pre-incident plans should be used in the development of exercise plans.  
K. CONCLUSION  
To improve a pre-incident planning program, one might think that the forty-four 
pages of guidance within NFPA 1620 is the only necessary source of guidance.171 While 
NFPA 1620 does provide extensive guidance, the best-practice research in this thesis—
conducted with the help of INL, ORNL, and BNL—provided the “tangible and visible 
behavior” data necessary to apply NFPA recommendations to a national laboratory fire 
department.172  
Several visible indicators qualify the pre-incident plan programs at INL, ORNL, 
and BNL as best-practice programs. For instance, these organizations have received 
positive DOE evaluations, while LAFD’s program has received multiple criticisms over 
the last twenty years. While LAFD has been criticized for poor collaboration and 
insufficient detail, other national laboratory sites require participation from a wide variety 
of people when developing and maintaining plans, and have specific requirements for 
data categories and supporting graphics.  
This research has clearly shown significant issues related to the LAFD pre-
incident planning process. Los Alamos Field Office Manager Kim Davis Lebak predicted 
that improving the LAFD pre-incident planning process could result in an improved 
emergency response, greater likelihood of saving lives, and a safer working environment 
for LAFD responders.173 If LAFD, LANL, and DOE/NNSA collectively work together 
and all are strongly committed to improving the pre-incident plans for LANL facilities, 
then Lebak’s predicted outcomes are possible.  
The greatest challenge to improvement will not be hardware, software, or physical 
changes; it will be a lack of commitment to change. Roman specifically noted the 
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difficulties associated with changing culture.174 Evaluations from DOE are not taken 
lightly; yet, despite these strong recommendations for change, the LAFD pre-incident 
planning program has not significantly changed and lags far behind planning programs 
for other national laboratory sites.  
The change effort will require the formation of a working group staffed by 
representatives from LAFD and LANL facilities, LANL emergency mangers, and other 
subject-matter experts. The membership will need to believe in the process and must have 
authority to make decisions without the need for approval from superiors. It might be 
wise to involve LANL and LAFD department directors to establish goals and outcomes 
for this working group. The importance of this change cannot be overstated; without 
proper knowledge of the issue, however, the importance of change might not be 
recognized. The findings in this thesis will provide the background knowledge necessary 
to ensure that long-overdue changes will come to the LAFD pre-incident planning 
program. 
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